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v. Sparr, 15 Mo. 184; and cannot set up title to the goods in
himself as a defence to such action: Osgood v. Nichols, 5 Gray
420. And see Huthinson v. Gordon, 2 Harr. (Del.) 179.
But if the principal had been guilty of such fraud that the purchaser could recover back the money from the auctioneer, the latter
is not liable to the owner for the amount, after notice from the purchaser not to pay it over: Stevens v. Legh, 2 0. L. R. 251; 22
Law T. R. 84 (.1853).
An auctioneer selling property not belonging to his principal, is
liable to the real owner for a conversion, though acting innocently:
Hoffman v. Carow, 20 Wend. 21; affirmed on error 22 Wend.
285; Hills v. Snell, 104 Mass. 177; -Davis v. Artingstall, 29
Weekly Reporter 137; Cochrane v. .Rymill, 40 Law T. R. 744;
fercantile Banc v. kRynill, 44 Id. 307; having of course a
remedy over against his employer: Adamson v. Jarvis, 12 Moore
241; 4 Bing. 66.
And if the real owner should recover the goods from the purchaser, the latter might refuse to pay for them; or if he had paid,
recover back the amount, as on a failure of consideration : -Dickenson v. Naule, 1 N. & M. 721; 4 B. & Ad. 638.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.
Boston, 1883.
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A witness is not the sole judge whether a question put to him may tend to criminate him. To entitle a witness to the privilege of silence the court must see, from
the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is
called upon to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the

witness from his being compelled to answer; but, if the fact of the witness being
in danger be once made to appear, great latitude should be allowed him in judging
for himself of the effect of any particular question.

was adjudicated a bankrupt on a
petition filed in the London Bankruptcy Court on the 23d September 1881. On the 4th of December 1880, he had executed a
post-nuptial settlement in favor of his wife and others, of which
settlement his brother, George Kossuth Mazzini Reynolds, was one
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of the trustees.

On the 24th of January 1882, G. K. M. Rey-

nolds was examined on oath before Mr. Registrar HAZLETT, by

counsel for the trustee in bankruptcy, touching his knowledge
of the bankrupt's property, and particularly with regard to the
circumstances under which the settlement had been executed, and
the property comprised in it. Various questions were put to the
witness, the greater number of which the witness, by the advice of
his counsel, declined to answer, on the ground that his answers
might tend to criminate him. It was obvious that answers to some
of the questions could not possibly have such a tendency.
The Registrar expressed an opinion that some of the questions
were legal and proper questions ; but, as the witness persisted in
his refusal, a formal order was made by the registrar, which, after
stating that the questions referred to in the transcript of the shorthand notes of the examination had been put, that the witness had
refused to answer them on the ground that these answers might tend
to criminate him, and that it appeared to the registrar that some
of the questions were legal and proper questions and that the witness was bound to answer them, referred the further examination
to the chief judge, with the view of rendering a special application
to his lordship for the committal of the witness to answer the questions unnecessary, and directed the witness to attend before the
chief judge on a certain day for such further examination.
The 20th of February was the day appointed for hearing the
reference from the registrar, and on that day the chief judge, after
reading the transcript and hearing counsel for the trustee and the
witness, ordered that the witness " do answer all lawful questions
put to him, and that the examination be referred back to the-registrar for that purpose," and that the witness should attend the examination at his own expense, and pay the osts of the application.
The witness appealed.
Rorton Smith, Q. C., and lt1ontagu Williams (Terrell with
them), for the appellant.
Arthur Charles, Q. 0., and P. C. Willis, for the trustee.
JESSEL, M. R.-There are two questions to be decided in this
case. One is of general importance; the other question arises on
the circumstances of the particular case. The question of general
importance is, whether, when a witness objects to answer a question
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on the ground that the answer to the question put to him may
criminate him or may tend to criminate him, the mere statement
of the belief of the witness himself will be sufficient, or whether
the judge is entitled to decide (not merely accepting the witness's
statement that he believes it) whether the proposed question has
really a tendency to criminate the witness, or might fairly be considered to have that tendency under all the circumstances of the
case. Now, upon that, there are various dicta, and one express
decision. I am quite aware that the express decision, being one
of the Court of Queen's Bench, is not technically binding on this
court; but at the same time it is a decision of the full Court of
.Queen's Bench, which was composed at that time of very eminent
judges, and I need not say that I should differ from them with
very great hesitation. That was in the case of Beg. v. Boyes.
It was heard in the year 1861, and this very point, as I read that
case, was not merely the subject of dicta, but clearly of decision.
CocxU Nt, C. J., gave judgment, and the present Lord BLACKBURN, and CI 0R0PTON and HILL, JJ., concurred in that judgment.
In the judgment given by the Lord Chief Justice he says this:
"It was also contended that a bare possibility of legal peril was
sufficient to entitle a witness to protection ; nay, further, that the
witness was the sole judge as to whether his evidence would bring
him into danger of the law, and that the statement of his belief to
that effect, not manifestly made mala fide, would be received as
conclusive. With the latter of these propositions we are altogether unable to concur. Upon review of the authorities, we are
clearly of opinion that the view of the law propounded by Lord
WEWSLEYDALE in Osborn v. London Dock Company, and acted
upon by STEWART, V. C., in Sidebottorn v. Adkins, is the correct
one, and that, to entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege
of silence, the court must see, from the circumstances of the case
and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give,
that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witnessfrom his being compelled to answer. Indeed, we quite agree that,
if the fact of the witness being in danger be once made to appear,
great latitude should be allowed to him in judging for himself of
the effect of any particular question, there being no doubt, as observed by ALDERsoN, B., in Osborn v. London -Dock Company,
that a question which might appear at first sight a very innocent
one, might, by affording a link in a chain of evidence, become the
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means of bringing home an offence to the party answering. Subject to this reservation, a judge is, in our opinion, bound to insist
on a witness answering, unless he is satisfied that the answer will
tend to place the witness in peril." That decision, it appears to
me, states the law correctly, and if it were necessary for the Court
of Appeal to affirm it, we should be doing well and wisely in saying we did affirm it. It is unnecessary, after that, to refer to the
prior decisions. They are all mere dicta, but I may say this, that,
as regards the subsequent case, in 1877, of _Ex parte Schofield, I
am not sure that it is a dictum; I rather think it is a decision.
That was the case where JAMES, L. J., said, with regard to an examination under this very 96th section of the Bankruptcy Act of
1869 : "Of course, in such a case, the judge must see whether the
objection is a genuine one or not." As regards the prior cases we
not only have the opinion of a very eminent judge, the late Lord
WENSLEYDALE, which was given in the case of Osborn v. London,
Dock Company, but we have citations from three standard works,
namely, Best on Evidence (6th ed., p. 176), Phillips on Evidence,
10th ed., vol. 3, p. 488), and 'Taylor on Evidence (7th ed., 1225),
and they all state the rule'in the same way as it was in effect ultimately decided. They also state this, which is obvious, tha if
you allowed the witness, merely on his own statement of his belief
that an answer to the question would tend to criminate him (for
that is all ; he is only bound to believe that), to refuse to answer
the question, it would enable a friendly witness, who wished to
assist one of the parties, to escape examination altogether, and to
refuse to give his evidence; an evil so great that, when weighed
even against the chance of occasionally assisting to convict a guilty
man, it would certainly far overbear, as a question of public policy,
the danger, if it is to be treated as a danger, of assisting to convict
a guilty man occasionally out of his own mouth. Perhaps our law
has gone even too far in that direction; and, without at all im'pugning the policy of the law, there certainly must be a larger
policy, which requires a person to answer, where the judge thinks
he is not bona fide objecting with a view of claiming privilege to
protect himself, but'to prevent other parties getting that testimony
which is necessary for the purposes of justice. Now, even as
regards judges who entertain the contrary opinion, it is quite plain
that they make the exception of mala fides. I have only to refer, for
that, to the statement of POLLOCK, 0. B., in the case of Adams v.
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Lloyd, where, having stated the rule in favor of protection on a
witness's own oath, he says this: " The only exception I would
make would be this: if the circumstances disclosed made the judge
perfectly certain that the witness was trifling with the court, and
availihig himself of a rule of law in which in fact there was no
good ground, then I think it is the duty of the judge to insist on
his answering." ' So that even those judges who hold to the other
rule make that exception. That being so, the second question we
have to consider is, whether it does appear to the court in this case
that there is any reasonable fear of the questions, when answered,
tending to convict the witness of a criminal offence, or tending to
criminate him in any way. When the court has to decide that
point, it must consider what the nature of the case is, and what
the witness has said. When you look at these questions, and what
he has refused to answer, the conviction, I think, must force itself
upon the mind of any one that the witness refused to answer because he did not want to give the information, and that he was
trifling with the court. The kind of questions which he refused to
answer seemed to me to lead to that conclusion. But it is suggested that, though the witness did not say so, and though there
was no evidence before the court, there was a real danger of his
being indicted, together with his brother, for what would be, no
doubt, a conspiracy if proved, that is, a deliberate combining with
his brother to cheat the brother's creditors by withdrawing from
them a portion of the brother's property. That, no doubt, would
be an indictable offence, but we must see whether there is any
indication of anything of the kind. In the first place, all that is
alleged against the witness is, that he is the trustee of a voluntary
settlement, and that in that capacity certain stocks, &c., were transferred to him. Then he is asked whether he is the trustee, what
stocks, &c., were transferred to him, and what has become of them.
There is not anywhere any suggestion in the proceedings in bankruptcy that there was anything like conspiracy between himself
and his brother. There is produced a document, not issued by any
of the parties in the bankruptcy, but by some creditors of the
brother, who have filed a statement of claim, in which the same
facts are alleged, but it is there also alleged that the transfer was
made to this witness, and as he well knew by the bankrupt, with
the view to defraud his creditors. But even that allegation' does
not make a charge of conspiracy ; it is only made to defeat the
VOL. ).--4
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operation of the settlement as against the creditors, who were the
plaintiffs in that action. I do not think for a moment that the
witness is under any bona fide belief that any such charge of conspiracy will be made, or that he had any idea of such a charge; in
fact, I think the notion of an indictment for such a conspiracy
could only present itself to the mind of some one who was very
familiar indeed with the law of conspiracy. The real position of
matters appears to me to be, that the witness did not wish to afford
any assistance to the creditors in obtaining possession of the property
of the bankrupt which had been kept from them. I think that
was the real prevailing motive with him, and not any real fear of
criminal proceedings. That being so, I think he ought to answer
the questions, subject, however, to this observation, that he will be
entitled to object to any particular question which obviously has a
tendency to criminate him, or which, in the opinion of the presiding judge, would tend to criminate him in regard to any matter,
or may be reasonably held to criminate him; that is to say, we do
not intend to decide that he must answer every question that he
has been asked, but that he must answer the questions subject
to objecting to particulat questions, on a reasonable ground that
that particular question, or those particular questions, might criminate him, or might tend to criminate him.
am of the same opinion, and on the same
L. J.-I
grounds. There is but little for me to add. As I understand,
Mr. Horton Smith's contention was this, that a witness, on being
called, may, at the very first question which is asked him, at once
put down his foot and say, "I refuse to answer that question, because it may tend to criminate me," although there is nothing stated
by him, and no facts appear in the case which would render that
even possible. In my opinion that would lead to the most monstrous conclusion. I will say no more than that I think the rule
is correctly stated in the case of Beg. v. Boyes, and that to that
decision, and the rule there laid down I adhere. As regards the other
point, whether the witness in this particular case can protect himself effectually, I think we have got the rule laid down by JAMES,
L. J., in the case of Ez parte Scholefield, Be Firth; that is to
say, that the judge must satisfy himself and decide whether the
objection is a genuine one. Looking at the way in which this witness claims his privilege, I am satisfied, as the registrar seems
COTToN,
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clearly to have been, that it was not a genuine objection on the
ground that it would tend to criminate him. To every question that
was asked him, eyen such a question as this, "Have you ever been
at Mr. James's office in Fleet street in your life ?" his answer was,
"I object to answer that, on the ground that it may tend to criminate me." Now I cannot think that that was a genuine objection
on the ground stated, but that there wag some other reason for the
witness putting his foot down at once and saying, " You. will getnothing out of me." I think, therefore, the order was right. Of
course this will not decide that, if he does refuse to answer any
question as to which there is a reasonable probability that the
answer would tend to criminate him, he is bound to answer that.
The court will consider any such objection taken by him when, and
if it is taken.
LINDLEY, L. J.-I
am of the same opinion. The order appealed from was made by the chief judge in bankruptcy, and it
was, in substance, that this gentleman should submit to an examination at his own expense, and should answer all lawful questions
that might be put to him. That order, of course, must be qualified.
The reason it was made was that he declined to answer anything at
all. Now let us consider that. The effect of the examination
satisfies me that his objection was not taken bona fide for his o ff
protection at all. He did not, in fact, know of this claim ; the
claim had not then come to his knowledge.. But, apart from that,
the tone of his answers satisfies me that he was not considering his
own protection, but that he was considering how he could prevent
those interested in upsetting this settlement from succeeding in that
object. That was what was passing through his mind, and not any
danger of a criminal proceeding. Twenty'years ago this question
as to how far the oath of a witness was conclusive was settled by
the Court of Queen's Bench in Beg. v. Boyes, and that decision
has never been disturbed since. There were, as to that, differences of opinion before, but to the rule so laid down then, which I
have never heard questioned since, we are all disposed to adhere.
I have always thought that the rule as laid down there was perfectly well settled, and it is not for us now to disturb it. Then, as
to what is to be done in the future; of course, I do not mean to
say there may not be some indictment for conspiracy against
this gentleman. I do not know whether there will or will not, and
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do not know whether he is open to it or not; possibly lie is. I
can well understand that some ingenious gentleman like Mr. Montagu Williams might suggest how an indictment for conspiracy
might be framed against him. That is possible enough. If, when
further questions are put to him, he declines to answer, and the
judge or presiding registrar is of opinion that he is declining to
answer bona-fide for his own protection, and there is any appreciable danger to him, the witness will be entitled to the benefit of
silence; otherwise he will have to answer the questions put to him.
This appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs.
I

At the commencement of the present
century, the Criminal Code of England
was, perhaps, the most severe in Europe.
To-day it is probably the most nhumane.
The history of English criminal law, of
its growth and development, of the protection it accorded or failed to accord to
persons accused of crime, is full of interest and exceedingly instructive. It is
sufficiently startling to find that an act of
Elizabeth made picking a pocket a capital
offence, but our surprise is surpassed
when we find that an act was passed as
lat as the reign of William III., which
affixed the same penalty to shoplifting,
although the article did not eceed the
value of five shillings. And the opposition that Sir S.LMuEr. RomiLLY and Sir
JntrEs MACINTOsa had to contend with
in their efforts to mitigate the severity
of the penal code, in the first quarter of
the present century, makes strange reading for us of to-day. We exclaim
against the superstitious barbarity of
ancient times, which demanded that a
person accused of crime should demonstrate his innocence in a trial by ordeal,
and pity the ancient Greeks, as we read
in the Antigone of Sophocles, how a person suspected by Creon of a misdemeanor, declared himself ready "to
handle lit iron and to walk over fireII
to prove his innocence. At the same
time, we forget that it was not until 188
that trial by "wager of battle" was
abolished in England. And it was not
until 1836 that prisoners accused of

crime were allowed by the laws of England to have counsel to defend them.
Not only was counsel denied to tie accused, but for a long time a person accused of a capital crime was not suffered
to exculpate himself by the testimony
of any witnesses. Queen Man, however, when she appointed Sir RIcHARD
MORGAN to be Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, informed him, "that notwithstanding the old error, which did not
admit any witness to speak, or any other
matter to be heard, in favor of the adversary, her majesty being party, her
highness' pleasure was, that whatsoever
should be brought in favor of the subject
should be admitted to be heard :" Hollingsh. 1112; St. Tr. I. 72; 4 Blackstone's Com. 359. A glance at the past
satisfies us that English criminal law,
in times not long past, was ufinecessarily
severe and inhuman. It certainly did
not err in favor of the accused. It is
possible, however, that in more recent
years the tendency has been to favor the
accused at the expense of justice.
But one of the most important principles adopted in the interests of justice
and humanity is that which requires that
the proceeding to establish guilt shall not
"A peculiar excelbe inquisitorial.
lence of the common law system of trial
over that which has prevailed in other
civilized countries, consists in the fact
that the accused is never compelled to
give evidence against himself. Much as
there was in that system tbat was heartless
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and cruel, it recognised fully the dangerous and utterly untrustworthy character
of extorted confessions, and was never
subject to the reproach that it gave judgmenr upon them :" Cooley's Const. Lim.
384. That an accused person cannot be
compelled at common law to give evidence
tending to criminate himself is so well established that any citation of the authorities seems superfluous. Nevertheless,
reference may be had to the following :
Low v. Mitchell, 18 Mfe. 372 ; State v.
Bilansky, 3 2inn. 246, 258; Simmons
v. Holster, 1I Id. 249 ; Head's Case, 44
Miss. 731 ; Statev. Sneed, 84 N. C. 822;
('omnmonwealtlh v. NZichols, 114 Mass. 286;
Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 404; Grannis
v. Brandon, 5 Day 272 ; Hall v. State,
40 Ala. 698 ; Calhoun v. Thompson, 56
Id. 166 ; Clark v. Reese, 35 Cal. 89 ;
Lx parle Roowe, 7 Id. 184 ; Cossart v.
State, 14 Ark. 539 ; Bellinger v. People,
8 Wend. 596; People v. Hackley, 24
N. Y. 83; Phcenix v. Dupy, 53 How.
Pr. 158; Cullen v. Commonwealth, 24
Gratt. 624; Jennings v. Pentice, 39
Mffich. 421.
The principal case considers the question whether a witness is the sole judge
whether a question put to him may tend
to criminate him. The English cases
are examined in the opinions pronounced,
and it is announced that while the
question raised has been alluded to in
several cases, there have only been two
express decisions thereon. The first was
in Regina v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, decided as late as 1861. The second was
in Lx parte Schofield, L. R., 6 Ch. Div.
230, decided in 1877. Previous to these
decisions, it seems there had been merely
dicta expressed on both sides of the
question. To these two express decisions there is now added that announced
in the principal case, all three agreeing
that the court must determine from the
nature of the case and the character of
the question whether an answer to it
might be such as to criminate the witness.

It is curious to notice that while there
was no express decision on this question
in England until 1861, there were
several decisions in the courts of this
country, announced at a much earlier
day, and of the same tenor as that announced in the principal case. But
these cases seem to have been overlooked
by the English courts in their consideration of the subject. The matter came
up in this country in 1807 in the famous
trial of Aaron Burr, for treason, in the
Circuit Court of the United States, at
Richmond. Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL presided. Several days were consumed in the argument of the question
by distinguished counsel. The chief justice took time to deliberate, and announced that the court must determine
in the first instance whether the question
was of such a nature that an answer
could criminate the witness. That if the
court saw that the question was of such
a description that an answer to it might
or might not criminate the witness, according *to the purport of the answer,
that in such case it then rested with the
witness, who alone could tell what his
answer would be, to answer the question
or not. "If in such a case he say, upon
his oath, that his answer would criminate
himself, the court can demand no other
testimony of the fact. If the declaration be untrue, it is in conscience and in
law as much a perjury as if he had declared any other untruth upon his oath ;
as it is one of those cases in which the
rule of law must be abandoned, or the
oath of the witness be received :" 4
Causes C6lhbres 253 ; Burr's Tial; s.
c., 1 Rob. 215.
In People v. M1ather, 4 Wend. 229,
254 (1830), this subject was carefully
considered in the Supreme Court of New
York, Mr. Justice 'Mtncr pronouncing
the opinion. The conclusion reached was
thus expressed : "Where he claims to be
excused from answering because his answer will have a tendency to implicate
him in a crime or misdemeanor, or will
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expose aim to a penalty or forfeiture,
then the court are to determine whether
the answer he may give to the question
can criminate him directly or indirectly,
by furnishing direct evidence of his guilt,
or by establishing one of many facts,
which together may constitute a chain of
testimony sufficient to warrant his conviction, but which one fact of itself could
not produce such result; and if they
think the answer may in any way criminate him, they must allow his privilege,
without exacting from him-to explain
how he would be criminatet by the answer
which the truth may oblige him to give.
If the witness was obliged to show how
the effect is produced, the protections
would at once be annihilated. The
means which he would be in that case
compelled to use to obtain protection,
would involve the surrender of the very
object for the security of which the
protection was sought."
And to the
same effeci is Curtis v. Knox, 2 Denio
341, 342 (1845).

So the Supreme Court of Neiv Hampshire in Janvrin v. Scairaon, 9 Foster
290 (1854), declared: " Whether the
answer may tend to criminate or expose
the witness, is a point which the court
will determine under all the circumstances of the case ; but without requiring him fully to explain how lie might
be criminated by the answer, which the
truth would oblige him to give; for if
he were obliged to show how the effect
would be produced, the protection which
the rule is designed to afford would be
destroyed." And in 1854, in Ricknaa
v. State, 2 Greene 532, the Supreme
Court of Iowa followed the rule announced in Burr's Case, supra, and held
that while the witness was the sole judge
when it appeared from the very nature
of the question that any answer might
criminate him, yet it would be otherwise
in cases where this did not appear from
the nature of the question.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
has sometimes been supposed to have laid
down a contrary rule in State v. Ed-

wards, 2 Nott & McCord 13 (1819),
where it is declared that the witness and
not the court determines the matter, and
it is said : 11It is utterly impossible that
the court can decide without possessing
a full and complete knowledge of all the
facts which it may be important for the
witness to conceal; therefore something
must necessarily be left to the witness ;
and we have the same security for a
knowledge of the fact that lie may be
implicated by the answer, that we have
for the knowledge of any other fact."
It is to be observed, however, that the
language used is entirely consistent with
the rule laid down in Burr's C'ase, provided the question asked was such that
the court could see from it that an answer might implicate the witness. And
as we read the case, the court seems to
have been satisfied that the answer might
criminate the witness, or lead up to a
question that would directly do so.
It is, moreover, to be observed that the
same court in Poole v. Perritt, I Spear
128 (1842), while recognising the anthority of State v. Edwards, supra, at
the same time recognised the authority of tile rule announced in Burr's
Case. As we read the cases they are
consistent with Burr's Case.
But Warner v. Lucas, 10 Ohio 336
(1840), is no doubt to be recognised as
holding that the witness himself is sole
judge whether a question will criminate
him, and that the court has no afithority
in the matter. It cannot be reconciled
with the rule in Burr's Case. And it
may be that Ciarnberlain v. Willson, 12
Vt. 492, 493 (1840), is to be understood
in the same way, although that is not so
clear. However this may be, we take
it that it is evident that the weight of
authority in this country is clearly in
support of the doctrine announced in the
principal case.
While a witness is not bound to answer
a question criminating himself, yet a
question may be properly put to a witness the answer to which may criminate
him, for it is his privilege to answer or
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to refuse to answer. And he may consequently waive his privilege if lie thinks
proper: People v. Arnold, 40 Mich. 710;
United States v. Craig, 4 Wash. C. 0.
732; Vaughn v. Perrine, 3 N. J. Law
728; Fries v. Brugler, 12 Id. 79;
Chamberlain v.. Willson, 12 Vt. 439;
Treat v. Browning, 4 Conn. 408; Southard v. Rerford, 6 Cowen 259; Newcomb v. State, 37 Miss. 383; Low v.
Mitchell, 18 Me. 372 ; State v. Bilansly,
3 Minn. 246, 258 ; Simmons v. Holster,
13 Id. 249.
It is the privilege of the witness
alone to decline to alswer. The party
against whom he is called cannot object
to his giving evidence to criminate himself: Commonwealth v. Shaw, 4 Cush.
594; Clark v. Reese, 35 Cal. 89 ; State
v. Foster, 23 N. 1. 348; lNewcomb's
Case, supra; Coburn v. Oddl, 30 N. H.
540; Haines v. Dennett, II Id. 180;
MaCarty v. Bond, 9 La. 351 ; Regina
v. Kinglake, 11 Cox 499.
Neither is it the privilege of counsel to
interpose the objection: Thomas v. Newton, M. & M. 48 n., per Ld. TESTERDES,; Regina v. Adey, 1 31. & R. 94;
State v. Wentworth, 65 Me. 234.
If the witness is aware of his right to
decline to answer, baving been informed
thereof, yet chooses to waive his privilege
and answer, he thereby surrenders his
right to object to answering any further
questions in relation to that transaction,
but is bound to answer all questions
"By the common
relative thereto.
law," said Mr. Chief Justice GRAY, of
Massachusetts, "a witness cannot be
obliged to criminate himself, and may
therefore refuse to testify to any facts
which will tend to prove him guilty of a
crime. But his refusal must be made at
the beginning of his examination upon
the issue whether a crime has been committed by him. If lie answer any questions upon that subject, he cannot afterwards interpose his privilege, but is
liable to be fully examined and crossexamined upon the matter :" Foster v.

Pierce, 11 Cush. 437 ; Commonwealth v.
Pice, 10 Gray 472; Commonwealth
v. Nichols, 114 Mass. 286. See also
Brown v. Brown, 5 Mass. 320; State v.
4
Foster, 3 Foster 354; State v. K-,
N. H. 562; Low v. Mitchell, 18 Me.
372 Commonwealth v. Pratt, 126 Mass.
462; Afattodcs r. Owen, 5 Vt. 47
Chamberlain v. Wfillson, 12 Id. 491;
Dixon v. Vale, 1 Car. & P. 278 ; East
v. Chapman, 2 Id. 570; Dandridge v.
Corden, 3 Id. 11. But the witness cannot be held to have waived his privilege
if he was unaware that he possessed the
privilege of declining to answer: Cullen
v. Commonwealth, 24 Gratt 624. If, however, his testimony hms been given with
a knowledge of the privilege, but without fully understanding it, it then becomes discretionary with the trial judge
to allow the witness to claim his privifaya
lege and strike out the evidence:
v. Mayo, 119 'ass. 290. The fact that
the witness has waived his privilege as
to one criminal act constitutes no waiver
as to another criminal act not connected
therewith : Low v. Mitchell, supra.
A witness cannot be excused from
answering a question criminating himself when a criminal prosecution for the
imputed offence is barred by the Statute
of Limitations: Calhoun v. Thompson,
56 Ala. 166 ; United States v. Smith, 4
Day 126 ; Roberts v. Allatt, 'l. & M.
192, per Ld. TNxTERDN
; Parklur.t
v. Lowten, 1 Mer. 400, per Ld. ELDox;
Williams v. Farrington,2 Cox Ch. 202;
Davis v. Reid, 5 Sim. 443. Neither
can he claim the privilege when he has
been pardoned: Regina v. Boyes, 1
Best & S. 309, 327. But it has been
said that the witness is entitled to insist
on the privilege of not answering when
the answer would subject not merely the
witness but even the husbgnd or the
wife of the witness to a criminal prosecation: Cartwright v. Green, 8 Vesey
406; Regina v. All Saints, 6 If. & S.
200; 2 Taylor's Ev. 1453.
It is a well-known fact that by ex-
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press provision in the Constitution of the
United States, and in the Constitutions
of the several states, with hardly an exception, this right to be protected against
giving self-criminating evidence has been
secured beyond the power of legislative
or judicial infringement. But statutes
have been adopted in some of the states
providing that the testimony given by a
witness on the trial of another cannot be
used against such witness in. a criminal
prosecution for the offence concerning
which lie testifies, and providing for his
giving testimony on such trial against
such third party, subject to this protection. And in this connection it has
been held that the constitutional provisions above noted are designed for the
protection of the witness against conviction for a criminal offence, and not as
an immunity for crime, and that to the
extent that such statutes afford him protection against such conviction they are
no invasion of his right to be exempt
from self-accusation : Cossart v. State,
14 Ark. 539 ; State v. Quarles, £3 Id.
307; Exparte Rowe, 7 Cal. 184.
It is to be noted, however, that the
constitutional provision that "no accused shall be compelled to give evidence
against himself in any criminal case'" is,
in general, a protection to the witness
either on his own or on another's trial:
Cullen v. Commonwealth, 24 Gratt. 624;
Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172 ; People
v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74.
It is familiar to all that in some of the
states statutes have been passed which
give to an accused person the right to
testify in his own behalf. "These statutes, however, cannot be so construed as
to authorize compulsory process against
an accused to compel him to disclose
more than he chooses; they do not
so far change the old system as to
establish an inquisitorial process for obtaining evidence ; they confer a privilege
which tie defendant may use at his
option. If he does not choose to avail
himself of it unfavorable inferences are

not to be drawn to his prejudice from
that circumstance ; and if lie does testify, lie is lit liberty to stop at any point
he chooses, and it must be left to the
jury to give a statement, which he decdines to make a full one, such weight as,
under the circumstances, they think it
entitled to ; otherwise the statute must
have set aside and overruled the constitutional maxim which protects an accused
party against being compelled to testify
against himself, and the statutory privilege becomes a snare and a danger:
Cooley's Const. Lim. (4th ed.) *317,
and cases there cited. It is to be observed, however, that it has been held
that where a defendant in a criminal case
at his own request becomes a witness,
he thereby waives his constitutional
privilege and subjects himself to the
peril of cross-examination as to all
matters pertinent to the issue. "He
cannot have the privilege of self-exonerative testimony without incurring the
dangers incident to discreditive or criminative cross-interrogation :" State r.
Ventworth, 65 Me. 240 ; State v. Ober,
52 N. H. .459 ; Commonwealth v. Bonnet,
97 Mass. 587 ; Commonwealth v. e1organ, 107 Id. 199; Commonwealth v.
.Alullen, 97 Id. 545 ; Connors v. People,
50 NL.Y. 240; People v. Casey, 72 Id.
393; People v. Greenfield, 23 Hun 471.
It is held that a party offering himself
as a witness in his own behalf, and refusing to answer upon the ground that
his answer might have a tendency to
criminate himself stands differently from
a third person brought into court to testify in a case in which he has no interest,
and that his refusal to answer in such
case is competent evidence against him :
Andrews v. Frye, 104 Mass. 234; COMnmonwealth v. Nichols, 114 Id. 287;
Norfolk v. Gaylord, 28 Conn. 309.
The length of this note precludes us
from considering at length the interesting question whether tie courts can order
a person accused of crime to make profort of his person. Would this be, in
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effee, compelling the witness to give
evidence against himself, and therefore a
violation of his constitutional rights ?
The authorities are in conflict on this
subject. The courts of North Carolina,
Nevada and Texas have recognised the
right of the court to compel the accused
to make profert of his person: Garret's
Case, 71 N. C. 85 ; State v. Ah Chuey,
14 Nev. 79; lValker v. State, 7 Tex.
Ct. of App..245, 265. While in Georgia,
New York and Tennessee a different
conclusion has been reached: Blackwell
v. State (Sup. Ct. of Ga.); 3 Crim.
Law Mag. 394; Day v. State, 63 Ga.
667; People v. MlcCoy, 45 How. Pr.
216 ; Stokes v. State, 5 Baxter 619 ;
s. a. 30 Am. Rep. 72; And see 15
Cent. L. J. 2, where these cases have
been considered in detail by the writer
of this note.
In M1yers v. State, 8 Tex. Court of
App. 321, the court considers it questionable whether a recusant witness can
be put in solitary confinement on bread
and water until he answers. The general rule in commitments for contempt,
when the imprisonment is intended
merely as a punishment for the offence,
is that the commitment should specify
some definite time during which the imprisonment is to continue. But it is
well settled that where a witness refuses
to answer a lawful question he may be
imprisoned until he does answer, and
his imprisonment need not be limited to
a given number of days: Ex parte Rieashaw, 6 Mo. App. 474. And see Goff
V. Case, 3 Man. & Sl. 203.
We conclude thisnote with the following from the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Illinois in Sprague v. Craig,
51 I1. 292 : "When a witness obstinately refuses to testify, and is contumacious after imprisonment, we can
perceive no means of relief to the party
who desires his testimony, unless it be
by an action against the witness to recover for the consequential injury he has
thus inflicted upon the party. It is not
VOL. XXXI.-5

required that the court shall continue the
cause from day to day for days, weeks,
and, it may be, for months, until an
obstinate witness shall yield to the re.
quirements of the law, and shall discharge a.plain duty and enable justice to
be done between litigants. It is the
duty of the court, in such cases, to fine
and imprison a witness who perversely
refuses to testify, until he yields obedience to the law, but the extent of the
fine or imprisonment is a matter collateral to, and does not concern the parties litigant, only so far as it may
incidentally affect their rights by compelling the witness to testify."
Since the above note was prepared
the writer has had the opportunity of
reading the very interesting and able
opinion of Mr. Surrogate CALVIzz, of
New York, in Youngs v. Youngs, decided in March 1882, and reported in 5
Redf. 505, and which has just come to
band. In that case the very question
arose which the court had to consider in
the principal case, and the English
authorities were fully examined. The
conclusion reached was similar to that in
the principal case.
We may be pardoned for quoting as follows from that
opinion: "I have been able to find no
reported case in which this privilege of
refusing to answer on account of possible peril has been successfully invoked,
where the nature of the question did
not, under the particular circumstances,
apparent at the time, immediately suggest the reasonableness of the claim and
the injustice of denying it.

* *

* It

seems to me that, in this matter, there
are two extremes, which ought equally
to be avoided : First. That of requiring
from a witness, who has honestly claimed
the privilege, any explanation whatever
of his reason for refusing to answer, if
the court can see how such answer may
fairly and reasonably tend to criminate
him. Second. That of permitting a
witness to interpose the shield of apprehended peril as a protection against
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every question which he is disinclined to
answer, although there may be nothing
in the circumstances of the case which in
the least suggests that such answers
would be fraught with danger. The
latter extreme is quite as dangerous to
public policy as the former. I shall not

presume to suggest any general rule
governing this subject, and doubt, mdeed, whether any definite and precise
The witness
rule can be prescribed."
in this case was compelled to answer.
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One partner has no authority to execute a general assignment of all the property
of a firm for the benefit of all its creditors, without the assent, expressed or implied,
of his co-parmer, unless such co-part er be absent so that he cannot be consulted,
or is incapable from some cause of expressing either assent or dissent; and such an
assignment being executed without authority is absolutely void.
The fact that under such an assignment a fair and equitable proportion of the
assets will be given to an attaching creditor, and that the partner not joining in the
deed does not complain affords no ground for denying such creditor the rights of
priority which he has acquired under his attachment.
THIS action at law was brought by plaintiff against Pierpont &
Tuttle, and an attachment was issued thereon on the ground of the
non-residence of defendants, which was levied upon certain land.
Service was had by publication and judgment rendered for plaintiff.
After judgment Chandler intervened by petition, showing that
defendants bad no interest in the land attached, which had been,
before the attachment, conveyed to him. Upon this petition of
interventiot a trial was had upon the issues involving the intervenor's interest in and title to the land. No questions except such
as pertain to these issues are in the case. The cause upon the
intervenor's petition was tried by the court without a jury, and a
judgment rendered for the intervenor's discharging the attachment
levied upon the land. Plaintiff appealed.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BECKc, J.-The evidence shows that defendants, Pierpont &
Tattle, were partners, doing business in Illinois, and that prior to
the attachment of the land in question, Tuttle executed an assignment of all the property of the firm to the intervenor, Chandler, for
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the benefit of its creditors, the proceeds of the property to be applied
pro rata to all. The deed of assignment was executed in the name
of the firm and also by Tuttle personally, but without Pierpont's
knowledge or assent, and at the time he was in the town where the
firm transacted business and where the deed was executed, and
where both of the parties lived. It is also shown that Pierpont,
as soon as he was informed of the assignment, objected thereto in
a written notice to Tuttle, claiming that the partnership had been
dissolved more than a month prior to the execution of assignment.
Pierpont also gave Chandler, before he had given bond as assignee,
a written notice objecting and protesting against his acting under
the deed. The land in controversy was the property of the firm,
the legal title being held for convenience by Tuttle.
We are required to determine whether the deed of assignment
executed under these circumstances is valid. The controlling question in the case is this: Has a partner power to execute a general
assignment of all the property of the firm for the benefit of all its
creditors without the assent, expressed or implied, of his co-partner,
when he may be consulted upon the subject, and is capable of expressing assent or dissent ? It would appear, upon principle, that
such power is not possessed by a partner. Under its exercise the
business of the firm may be, and under almost all circumstances
would be, destroyed, and the partnership itself practically dissolved
as to future business. It is true that, theoretically, the assignment
is for the purpose of effecting the payment of firm debts, and that
the law allows one partner to use the property of the firm to discharge its indebtedness. But this rule of law is applicable to transactions occurring in the ordinary business of the firm, and does
not authorize one partner, upon the exercise of his individual discretion, to terminate the business of the co-partnership. In a matter
of such great importance to each partner both ought to be consulted and be permitted to determine whether the condition of their
affairs requires them to transfer all their property and abandon their
business. We think the American cases are almost unanimous in
holding that one partner has not the authority to execute an assignment of the property of the firm unless his co-partner be absent so
that he cannot be consulted, or is incapable, from some cause, of expressing either assent or dissent. We will not here present the
cases upon this subject. They are collected and most ably discussed
in Burrill on Assignments 48, 65 ; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 442, 462;
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Oollyer on Part., sect. 395 and notes ; and Story on Part., sect.
101 and notes.
A case decided by Ohief Justice MARSHALL at nisi prius (Anderson v. Tompkins, 1 Brock. 456) is the leading case cited as being
in conflict with the conclusions we announce. But it appears that
this decision, sustaining the assignment by one partner without the
assent of the other is not wholly based upon the power of the partner to make the deed, but is partly supported upon the necessity
of the case, the partner not joining in the deed being absent on a
voyage to Europe. The chief justice, in the course of his opinion,
uses this language in reference to the execution of the deed without
the assent of the absent partner : "It is true [he] bad a right to
be consulted. Had he been present he ought to have been consulted. The act ought to have been, and probably would have
been a joint act. But [he] was not present. He had left the
country and could not be consulted. He had by leaving the
country, confided everything which respected their joint business
to Tompkins [the other partner], who was under the necessity of
acting alone."
The learned annotators, Hare & Wallace, in 1 Am. Lead. Cas.
441, make the following statement as to decisions upon this point:
" Thus far there is no American case which says that one partner,
when the other members are present, may, without their consent,
make a general assignment of the firm effects to a trustee for the
benefit of creditors."
It is said that the assignment, though not authorized by the nonconcurring partner, is not void, and, at most, is but voidable; and
as in this case, no steps were taken to set aside the assignment, it
must stand. But this position is clearly unsound. The deed is
absolutely void for the very obvious reason that it was made without authority. The deed can have no effect whatever if there was
a want of authority to execute it by the single partner. All instruments executed in the absence of authority are void. Want
of authority in such a case strikes at the very life of the instrument.
It is, in fact, not the deed of the party it purports to bind. The
position, we think demands no further attention.
It is also said that plaintiff, who is a creditor of the firm, has
no ground of complaint, for he will receive his equitable portion of
the assets of the company. But if the deed be void no equity
arises which demands of him to surrender the priority he has secured
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by his attachment for the benefit of other creditors. The fact that
a fair and equitable distribution of the proceeds of the property
will be made is no argument to establish the validity of the deed.
We cannot hold a void instrument to be valid on the ground that
equity will be done by such a decisioi.
It is said, too, that Pierpont, the partner not joining in the deed,
is the party who alone can object to it, and that plaintiff has no
ground to complain. It seems to us that plaintiff, in that an
attempt is made to defeat the priority secured by his attachment
by setting up the assignment, is entitled to resist it in order to
secure his rights under the attachment. The fact that Pierpont
instituted no proceedings to set aside the assignment ought not to
work prejudice to plaintiff's rights.
It is our opinion that the judgment of the District Court ought
to be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
One partner may transfer or assign a
chose in action, or a debt due to the firm,
or any other partnership effects, so far
as the same can be transferred or assigned in law: Cullum v. Bloodgood, 15
Ala. 34; Everit v. Strong, 5 Hill 163;
s. a. 7 Id. 585 ; Clarke v. Hognan, 13
W. Va. 718 ; Harrison v. Sterry, 5
Cranch 289; Anderson v. Tompkins, I
Brock. 456; Mills v. Barber, 4 Day
428; Hodges v. Harris, 6 Pick. 360;
U. S. Bank v. Binney, 5 Mason 176 ;
Clark: v. Rlives, 33 Mlo. 579; Hudson v.
1Mc[ienzie, 1 E. D. Smith 358.
One partner may, without the knowledge or assent of his copartner, assign
directly to a creditor a part or the whole
of the partnership property to pay or
secure a firm debt existing or about to
be contracted: Afabbett v. WUtde, 12 N.
Y. 442 ; Fromme v. Jones, 13 Iowa
474; Mills v. Barber, 4 Day 428 ;
Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch 289;
McGregor v. Ellis, 2 Disney 286 ;
Lamb v. Durant, 12 fass. 54; Anderson v. Tompkins, 1 Brock. 461 ; Hodges
v. Harris,6 Pick. 360; Tapley v. Butterfield, I Iet. 515 ; Egberts v. Mood,
3 Paige 517; Boswell v. Green, 25 N.

J. L. 390; Cu~lum v. Bloodgood, 15
Ala. 34: McCullough v. Sommerville, 8
Leigh 415 ; Ormsbee v. Davis, 5 r. 1.
442; Russell v. Leland, 12 Allen 349.
The law will not, however, favor an
attempt by one partner to give a preference to particular creditors against the
wish of his copartners : 21atter of Lowenstein, 7 How. Pr. 100 ; and a general
assignment of the property of the firm
for the benefit of a portion of the firm
creditors, made by one partner against
the opposition of the other partner, of
which the beneficiaries under such assignment, or their agent procuring it,
have notice, is invalid: Bull v. Harris,
18 B. lon. 195.
Where the business of the firm is not
trade, buying and selling, but a business
to which the continued ownership of the
property sold is indispensable, one partner has no authority even to sell the firm
property without the knowledge or assent of his copartner: Sloan v. Moore, 37
Pa. St. 217, where authority was denied
one partner to sell a newspaper which
he and his copartner were publishing.
In general, however, one partner may
sell the whqle of the partnership pro-
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perty, if the sale be free from fraud on
the part of the purchaser; and such sale
dissolves the partnership, although the
term for which it was formed has not
expired: Whitton v. Smith, 1 Freem.
Ch. (Miss.) 231 ; Deckard v. Case, 5
Watts 22; Arnold v. Brown, 24 Pick.
89 ; Williamg v. Barnett, 10 Kans. 455;
Ryrschfelder v. Keyser, 59 Ala. 338;
Williams v. Roberts, 6 Coldw. 493;
Graser v. Stellwagen, 25 N. Y. 315.
See, however, Kimball v. Hamilton, 4-c.,
Ins. Co., 8 Bosw. 495.
As stated in. the principal case, it is
almost universally held that one partner
cannot, without the knowledge or consent of his copartner, assign all the partnership property to a trustee for the
benefit of all the creditors of the firm:
Deming v. Colt, 3 Sandf. 284; Hayes
v. Heyer, Id. 293; Havens v. Hussey, 5
Paige 30 ; Kirby v. Ingersoll, I Doug.
477 ; Dana v. Lull, 17 Vt. 390; Fisher
v. Mlurray, 1 E. D. Smith 341 ; Wetter
v. Schlieper, 4 Id. 707 ; Stein v. LaDow,
13 Minn. 413; Holland v. Drake, 29
Ohio St. 441 ; Hook v. Stone, 34 Mo.
329 ; Pearpoint v. Graham, 4 Wash. C.
C. 234 ; Hughes v. Ellison, 5 Mo. 463;
Dickinson v. Legare, 1 Dessaus. 537
Kimball v. Hamilton, 8 Bosw. 495;
Ormsbee v. Davis, 5 R. I. 442; Dunklin v. Kimball, 50 Ala. 251 ; Brooks v.
Sullivan, 32 Wis. 444 ; Kelly v. Baker,
2 Hilt. 531: Haggerty v. Granger, 15
How. Pr. 243; Paton v. Ilright, 15 Id.
481 ; Pettee v. Orser, 18 Id. 442 ; s. c.,
6 Bosw. 123; Welles v. .Iarch, 30 N.
Y. 344; Coope v. Bowles, 42 Barb. 38.
See, however, Graves v: Hall, 32 Texas
665; Hennessy v. Iestern Bank, 6 W.
& S. 300. A power to make a general
assignment may of course be expressly
conferred by one partner upon another,
or may, like any other power, be in-

ferred from the conduct of the partners,
their manner of doing business, ar.d the
circumstances in which they place themselves with reference to the business of
the firm: Kirby v. Ingersoll, 1 Doug.
Its exercise has, as is to be
490, 491.
inferred from the principal case, been
upheld by the courts in cases where the
non-assenting partnbrs were absent and
could uiot be consulted ; and also, where
such partners had made the assignor sole
managing partner, or where they had
subsequently ratified the assignment.
See Anderson v. Tompkins, ' Brock.
456 ; Stein v. LaDow, 13 Minn. 412;
Robinson v. Crowder, 4 McCord 519 ;
Deckardv. Case, 5 Watts 22 ; Harrison
v. Sterry, 5 Cranch 289, 300; .M1cCullough v. Sommerville, 8 Leigh 436 ; Bobinson v.
clntosh, 3 E. D. Smith 221 ;
FKsher v. M1urray, I Id. 341 ; Kenp v.
Carnley, 3 Duer 1 ; .lcNutt v. Strayhorn, 39 Pa. St. 369 ; Clark v. Wilson,
19 Id. 414 ; National Bank of Baltimore
v. Sackett, 2 Daly 395 ; s. a., 2 Abb. Pr.
N. S. 286 ; Roberts v. Shepard, 2 Daly
10 ; Brooks v. Sullivan, 32 Wis. 444;
Clark v. McClelland, 2 Grant's Cases
31 ; Baldwin v. Tynes, 19 Abb. Pr. 32 ;
Kelly v. Baker, 2 Hilt. 531 ; F orbes v.
Scannell, 13 Cal. 243; Robinson v. Gregory, 29 Barb. 560; Palmer v. lyers,
43 Id. 509; Hitchcock v. St. John, I
HotM 511 ; Sheldon v. Smith, 28 Barb.
593; Welles v. .arch, 30 N. Y. 344 ;
Palmer v. Myers, 29 How. Pr. 8. See,
however, Pettee v. Orser, 18 Id. 442 ;
s. c., 6 Bosw. 123, where the absence
of the partners not assenting was held to
create no emergency which justified the
See also,
assignment in that case.
Coope v. Bowles, 42 Barb. 88.
M. D. Ew-ELL.
Chicago.
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United States Circuit Court, Northern -Districtof Ohio.
JOHN HAYS & CO. v. THE PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY.
Discriminations in the rates of freight charged by a railroad company to shippers,
based solely on the amount of freight shipped, without reference to any conditions
tending to decrease the cost of transportation, are discriminations in favor of capital, are contrary to sound public policy, violative of that equality of rights guaranteed: to every citizen, and a wrong to the disfavored party, for which he is
entitled to recover from the railroad company the amount of freight paid. by him in
excess of rates accorded by it to his most favored competitor, with interest on such
sum.
The plaintiffs were engaged in mining coal at S. for sale at C. They were wholly
dependent on defendants for transportation. The regular tariff between those points
was $1.60 per ton, with a rebate from 30 to 70 cents per ton to persons shipping
over 5000 tons during a year; the amount of rebate being graduated according to
the quantity shipped. Under this schedule plaintiffs were required to pay higher
rates on the coal shipped by them than were exacted from other and rival parties
who shipped larger quantities. In an action to recover the excess paid by plaintiffs.
field, that such discrimination was illegal, and that plaintiffs were entitled to recover the amount paid by them in excess of the rate accorded to their most favored
competitor.
Nicholson v. G. TV. Railroad Co., 5 C. B. (N. S.) 436, distinguished.

MOTION for new trial.

The plaintiffs were, for several years next before the commencement of this suit, engaged in mining coal at Salineville,
and near defendant's road, for sale in the Cleveland market.

They were wholly dependent on the defendant for transportation.
Their complaint set forth that the defendant discriminated against
them, and in favor of their competitors in business, in the rates
charged for carrying coal from Salineville to Cleveland. The defendant traversed this allegation. On the trial, it appeared in evidence that defendant's regular price for carrying coal between the
points mentioned, in 1876, was $1.60 per ton, with a rebate of
from 30 to 70 cents per ton to all persons or companies shipping
5000 tons or more during the year-the amount of rebate being
graduated by the quantity of freight furnished by each shipper.
Under this schedule the plaintiffs were required to pay higher rates
on the coal shipped by them than were exacted from other and
rival parties who shipped larger quantities. The defendant contended, if the discrimination was made in good faith, and for the
purpose of stimulating its production and increasing its tonnage,
it was both reasonable and just and within the discretion confided
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by law to every common carrier. The court, however, entertained
the contrary opinion, and instructed the jury that the discrimina.
tion complained of and proven, as above stated, was contrary to
law and a wrong to plaintiffs for which they were entitled to recover
.the damages resulting to them therefrom, to wit, the amount paid
by the plaintiffs to the defendant for the transportation of their
coal from Salineville to Cleveland in excess of the rates accorded
by defendant to their most favored competitors, with interest on
such sum. The jury, under these instructions, found for the plaintiffs, and assessed their damages at $4585. The defendant thereupon moved for a new trial, 6n the ground that the instructions
given were erroneous.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
:BAXTER, 0. J.-A reference to recognised elementary principles
will aid in a correct solution of the problem.
The defendant
is a common carrier by rail. Its road, though owned by the corporation, was nevertheless constructed for public uses, and is, in a
qualified sense, a public highway.. Hence everybody constituting a
a part of the public, is entitled to an equal and impartial participation in the use of the facilities it is capable of affording. Its ownership by the corporation is in trust as well for the public as for the
shareholders; but its first and primary obligation is to the public.
We need not recount all these obligations. It is enough for present
purposes to say that the defendant has no right to make unreasonable and unjust discriminations. But what are such discriminations ? No rule can be formulated with sufficient flexibility to apply
to every case that may arise. It may, however, be said that it is only
when the discrimination enures to the undue advantage of one man,
in consequence of some injustice inflicted on another, that the law
intervenes for the protection of the latter. Harmless discrimination may be indulged in. Fo" instance, the carrying of one person, who is unable to pay fare, free, is no injustice to other
passengers who may be required to pay the reasonable and regular
rates fixed by the company. Nor would the carrying of supplies
at nominal rates to communities scourged by disease, or rendered
destitute by floods or other casualty, entitle other communities to
have their supplies carried at the same rate. It is the custom, we
believe, for railway companies to carry fertilizers and machinery
for mining and manufacturing purposes to be employed along the
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lines of their respective roads to develop the country and stimulate productions, as a means of insuring a permanent increase of
their business, at lower rates than are charged on other classes of
freight, because such discrimination, while it tends to advance the
interests of all, works no injustice to any one. Freight carried
over long distances may also be carried at a reasonably less rate
per mile than freight transported for shorter distances, simply
because it costs less to perform the service. For the same reason
passengers may be divided into different classes and the price regulated in accordance with the accommodations furnished to each,
because it costs less to carry an emigrant, with the accommodations
furnished to that class, than it does to carry the occupant of a
palace car. And for a like reason an inferior class of freight may
be carried at a less rate than first-class merchandise of greater
value and requiring more labor, care and responsibility in the
handling. It has been held that twenty separate parcels, done up
in one package and consigned to the same person may be carried
at a less rate per parcel than twenty parcels of the same character
consigned to as many different persons at the same destination,
because it is supposed that it costs less to receive and deliver one
package containing twenty parcels to one man, than it does to
receive and deliver twenty different parcels to as many different
consignees.
Such are some of the numerous illustrations of the rule that
might be given. But neither of them is exactly like the case
before us, either in its facts or principles involved. The case of
Nicholson v. C. W. B. Co., 5 C. B. (N. S.) 366, is in its facts
more nearly like the case under consideration than any other case
we have been able to find. This was an application, under the
Railway and Traffic Act, for an injunction to restrain the railroad
company from giving lower rates to the Ruabon Coal Company
than were given to the complainant in that case, in the shipment
of coal, in which it appeared that there was a contract between the
railroad company and the Ruabon Coal Company, whereby the
coal company undertook to ship for a period of ten years, as much
coal for a distance of at least one hundred miles over defendant's
road, as would produce an annual gross revenue of 40,0001. to the
railroad company, in fully-loaded trains, at the rate of seven trains
per week. In passing on these facts the court said that in considering the question of undue preference the fair interest of the
VOL. XX

I.-6

HAYS v. THE PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY.

railroad company ought to be taken into the account; that the
preference or prejudice referred to by the statute, must be undue
or unreasonable to be within the prohibition; and that, although it
was manifest that the coal company bad many and important advantages in carrying their coal on the railr6ad as against the complainant and other coal owners, still the question remained, were
they undue or unreasonable advantages? And this the court said
mainly depended on the adequacy of the consideration given by
the coal company to the railroad company for the advantages
afforded by-the latter to the coal company. And because it
appeared that the cost of carrying coal in fully-loaded trains,
regularly furnished at the rate of seven trains per week, was less
per ton to the railway company than coal delivered in the usual
way, and at irregular intervals, and in unequal quantities, in connection with the coal company's undertaking to ship annually coal
enough over the defendant's road, for at least a distance of one
hundred miles, to produce a gross revenue to the railroad of
40,0001., the court held that the discrimination complained of in
the case was neither undue nor unreasonable, and therefore denied
the application.
The case seems to have been well considered, and we have no
disposition to question its authority. Future experience may
possibly call for some modification of the principle therein announced. But this case calls for no such modification, inasmuch
as the facts of that case are very different, when closely analyzed,
from the facts proven in this one. In the former, the company,
in whose favor the discrimination was made, gave, in the judgment
of the court, an adequate consideration for the advantages conceded to it under and in virtue of its contract. It undertook to
guaranty 40,0001. worth of tonnage per year for ten years to the
railroad company, and to tender the same for shipment in fullyloaded trains at the rate of seven trains per week. It was in consideration of these obligations-which in the judgment of the court
enabled the railroad company to perform the service at less expense
-the court held that the advantages secured by the contract to
the coal company were neither undue nor unreasonable. But
there are no such facts to be found in this case. There was in
this case no undertaking by any one to furnish any specific quantity of freight at stated periods; nor was any one bound to tender
coal for shipment in fully-loaded trains. In these particulars the
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plaintiffs occupied common ground with the parties who obtained
lower rates. Each tendered coal for transportation in the same
condition and at such times as suited his or their convenience.
The discrimination complained of rested exclusively on the amount
of freight supplied by the respective shippers during the year.
Ought a discrimination resting exclusively on such a basis to
be sustained ? If so then the business of the country is, in some
degree, subject to the will of railroad officials; for, if one man.
engaged in mining coal and dependent on the same railroad for
transportation to the same market, can obtain transportation
thereof at from 25 to 50 cents per ton less than another competing
with him in business, solely on the ground that he is able to furnish and does furnish the larger quantity for shipment, the small
operator will sooner or later be forced to abandon the unequal contest and surrender to his more opulent rival. If the principle is
sound in its application to rival parties engaged in mining coal, it
is equally applicable to merchants, manufacturers, millers, dealers in
lumber and grain, and to everybody else interested in any business requiring any considerable amount of transportation by rail;
and it follows that the success of all such enterprises would depend
as much on the favor of railroad officials as upon the energies and
capacities of the parties prosecuting the same.
It is not difficult with such a ruling to forecast the consequences.
The men who control railroads would be quick to appreciate the
power with which such a holding would invest them, and, it may
be, not slow to make the most of their opportunities, and perhaps
tempted to favor their friends to the detriment of their personal or
political opponents; or demand a division of the profits realized
from such collateral pursuits as could be favored or depressed
by discriminations for or against them; or else, seeing the augmented power of capital, organize into overshadowing combinations,
and extinguish all petty competition, monopolize business, and dictate the price of coal and every other commodity to consumers.
We say these results might follow the exercise of such 'a right
as is claimed for railroads in this case. But we think no such
power exists in them; they have been authorized for the common
benefit of every one, and cannot be lawfully manipulated for the
advantage of any class at the expense of any other. Capital needs
no such extraneous aid. It possesses inherent advantages, which
cannot be taken from it. But it has no just claim, by reason of
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its accumulated strength, to demand the use of the public highways of the country, constructed for the common benefit of all, on
more favorable terms than are accorded to the humblest of the
land; and a discrimination in favot of parties furnishing the'
largest quantities of freight, and solely on that ground, is a discrimination in favor of capital, and is contrary to a sound public
policy, violative of that equality of right guarantied to every citizen, and a wrong to the disfavored party, for which the courts are
competent to give redress.
The motion, therefore, for a new trial, will be denied and a
judgment entered on the verdict for the damages assessed, and the
costs of the suit.
WELKER

, D. J., concurred.

The carriage of traffic free, or at
reduced rates, suggests for consideration :
I. Gratuitous transportation.
II. Public Policy.
Reasonable and unreasonable
II.
discriminations by carriers, and te relation between the expense of transportation and the price chargeable for it.
IV. Discriminations in traffic rates
based upon differences in traffic quantities.
I. GRATUXTOns TJIAxSrORTATIO.-

It is the duty of the operators and managers of corporate common carriers not
to cariy traffic gratuitously that otherwise
would be a profitable source of revenue.
They owe this duty to shareholders and
bond purchasers, whose contributions of
capital have been made with the expectation and right of receiving returns in
the shape of dividends and interest. This
right, it is obvious, would be defeated
if gratuitous transportation was permitted. They owe the duty also to the
public. They are under legal obligation
to deal equally and without unreasonable
discrimination with all persons. The
cases, therefore, wherein common carriers may carry gratuitously are exceptional. They are not to be considered in

settling the propriety of traffic charges or
discriminations. Upon this point Mr.
Justice Don, of New Hampshire, says:
"This question may be made unnecesby an indefiniteness, consarily diffiqult
fusion and obscurity of ideas that may
arise when the public duty of a common
carrier, and the correlative common
right to his reasonable service for a
reasonable price are not clearly and
broadly distinguished from a matter of
private charity. If A. receives as a
charity, transportation service without
price, or for less than a reasonable price,
from B. who is a common carrier, A.
does not receive it as his enjoyment of
the common right; B. does not give it
.as a performance of his public duty; C.,
who is required to pay a reasonable price
for a reasonable service, is not injured ;
and the public, supplied with reasonable
facilities and accommodations on reasonable terms, cannot complain that B. is
violating his public duty. There is in
such a case no discrimination, reasonable
or unreasonable, in that reasonable ser.
vice for a reasonable price which is a
common right. A person who.s a common
carrier may devote to the needy, in any
necessary form of relief, all the reasonable
'profits of his business. le has the same
right that any one else has to give money
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or goods or transportation to the poor.
But it is neither his legal duty to be
charitable at his own expense, nor his
legal right to be charitable at the expense
of those whose servant he is. If his
reasonable compensation for certain carriage is $100, and his just profit, not
needed in his business, is one-tenth of
that sum, he has $10 which he may
legally use for feeding the hungry,
clothing the naked or carrying those in
poverty, to whom transportation is one
of the necessities of life, and who suffer
for lack of it. But if he charges the $10
to those who pay him for their transportation, if he charges them $110 for $100
worth of service, he is not benevolent
himself, but lie is undertaking to compel
those to be benevolent who are entitled
to his service; he is violating the common right of reasonable terms, which
cannot be increased by compulsory contributions for any charitable purpose.
So, if he carries one or many for half
the reasonable price, and reimburses
himself by charging others more than the
reasonable price, he is illegally administering, not his own, but other people's
charity. And when he attempts to
justify an instance of apparent discrimination on the ground of charity, it may
be necessary to ascertain whose charity
was dispensed-whether it was his, or
one forced by him from others, including
the party complaining of it :" .fcDuffee
v. Railroad, 52 N. H. 452.
An application of these remarks suggests itself when one recalls the amount
of transportation gratuitously given to
journalists, lawyers, politicians, friends
and families of railway officials, and
other "deadhead" persons and property, in some instances requiring whole
trains for their carriage. The loss and
expense thus incurred are met by maintaining rates sufficiently high to pay
ordinary expenses, dividends and interest, and "deadhead" expenses besides.
Thus is the shipping public compelled to
pay for carriers' generosity (or charity).

"
The true way would be to leave 'deadof
considexpenses
entirely
out
head"
eration in fixing rates, and to deduct
them from the dividends of shareholders.
If they or the men they select to manage
their companies wish to be generous or
charitable, let them pay for the privilege
themselves, and not out of the pockets
of people compelled to patronize rail.
ways. Or if it be the duty of the public
to furnish gratuitous transportation, let
it be established by law what persons
and property are entitled to free carriage, and -when and why they are entitled to it. Then let the expense be
paid out of the public purse through
some recognised governmental agency,
either state or national, in order that it
may be borne equally by all taxpayers,
and not by the few whose business
requires them to pay freight to railway
carriers, or by the still fewer number (if,
indeed, there be any such) who happen
to be stockholders in corporate carriers,
and who pay out of their own pockets the
expense of carrying free the objects of
their generosity or charity. Under the
present system the expense of gratuitous
transportation is wholly borne by that
portion of the public who ship goods and
pay freight. 'Under a system equitable
and just it ought to be borne either by
the stockholders of carrying companies,
or by the whole public at large, accordingly as the generosity or charity of free
transportation is referrable to the one or
to the other.

II. PunLic PoLicy.-With reference
to transportation, free or at reduced
rates, public policy has received a governmental expression as to one class of
citizens, namely, soldiers. Their letters
may be transmitted by mail without prepayment. Their clothing may be transmitted by mail at reduced rates, and
they themselves, when discharged from
service, are furnished free transportation
to their homes. There are probably
good reasons for this discrimination by
the government, and reasons as good or

o HAYS v. THE PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY.
better justify railway companies in carrying free the persons, property and
families of immigrants who intend to
purchase and settle upon the lands of
such railways. The encouragement of
immigration, and the settlement and development of a new coufitry warrant
such discrimination, as well as that by
which agricultural implements are carried at reduced rates or free, as mentioned in theopinion in the principal
case.
Il.
REASONABLE AND UNREASONA-

of service ; there may be many differences of price and service, entirely consistent with the general principle of
reasonable equality which distinguishes
the duty of a common carrier in the legal
sense, from the duty of a carrier who
is Dot a common one in that sense.
A certain inequality of terms, facilities
or accommodations may be reasonable,
and required by the doctrine of reasonableness, and, therefore, not an infringement of the common right." This enunciation of the general principles of law
BLE DIscIIIacNATIoN; AND HEREIN OF applicable to carriers' discriminations is
THE RELATION BETWEEN THE EXPENSE clear and undoubtedly correct. ApplyOr TRANSPORTATION AND THE PRICE ing them in particular to passenger faciliCHARGEABLE FOR IT.-Dismissing as ties, Judge DOE continues: "It maybe
irrelevant and exceptional those cases the duty of a common carrier of passenwherein charity, and those wherein what gers to carry under discriminating remay perhaps not inaptly be termed rail- strictions, or to refuse to carry those who,
way public policy, warrants the carrier by reason of their physical or mental
either in making no traffic charge at all condition, would injure, endanger, disor in making one at a reduced rate, we turb or annoy other passengers : and an
come to the cases wherein tile traffic analogous rule may be applicable to the
charge is determined simply by a business common carriage of goods. Healthy
contract between the common carrier on passengers in a palatial car would not be
provided with reasonable accommodaone side and the shipper on the other-a
contract unaffected by such considerations tions if they were there unreasonably and
of charity or of public policy as are above negligently exposed, by the carrier, to
set forth. Here may well be quoted the society of small pox patients. Sober,
another extract from the ablest judicial quiet, moral and sensitive travellers may
opinion extant, relating to carriers' dis- have cause to complain of their accomcriminations, namely, the opinion by modations, if they are unreasonably
Mr. Justice DOE, of New Hampshire, exposed to the companionship of unrein j1lcDqffee v. Railroad, supra. That strained, intoxicated, noisy, profane and
jurist says: "Tie common and equal abusive passengers, who may enjoy
right is to reasonable transportation the discomfort they cast upon others.
service for a reasonable compensation. In one sense, both classes, carried toNeither the service -nor the price is gether, might be provided with equal
necessarily unreasonable because it is accommodations ; in another sense they
unequal, in a certain narrow, strict, and would not. The feelings not corporal,
literal sense ; but that is not a reasonable and the decencies of progressive civilizaservice, or a reasonable price, which is tion, as -well as physical life, health and
unreasonably unequal. The question is comfort, are entitled to reasonable acnot merely whether the service or price commodations. Mental and moral senis absolutely unequal, in the narrowest sibilities, unreasonably wounded, may
sense, but also whether the inequality is be an actual cause of suffering, as plain
unrcagonable and injurious. There may as a broken limb ; and, if the injury is
be acts of charity; there may be differ- caused by unreasonableness of facilities
ent prices for different kinds or amounts or accommodations (which are synony-
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mous with unreasonableness of service),
it may be as plain a legal cause of action
as any bodily hurt, commercial inconvenience or pecuniary loss. To allow one
passenger to be made uncomfortable by
another committing an outrage, without
physical violence, against the ordinary
proprieties of life and the common sentiments of mankind, may be as clear a
violation of the common right, and as
clear an actionable neglect of a common
carrier's duty, as to permit one to occupy
two seats while another stands in the
aisle. Although reasonableness of service or price may require a reasonable
discrimination, it does not tolerate an
unreasonable one ; and the law does not
require a court or a jury to waste time
in a useless investigation of the question
whether a proved injurious unreasonablehess of service or price was in its intrinsic or in its discriminating quality.
The main question is, not whether the
unreasonableness was in this or that, but
whether there was unreasonableness,
and whether it was injurious to the
plaintiff."
The discriminatiofns in passenger facilities noted above are obviously just,
and are readily made without wronging
any one. More difficulty is experienced
in applying the principle of discriminaion justly in fixing rates. A railway
rate is a charge for a specific railway
service. What, in justice to all parties,
should be the amount of the rate, will
depend upon the quantity and quality of
the service, and these in turn depend
upon many things, such as the cost of
the railway, its works and equipment,
gradient, mileage, fuel expenses, transit
and terminal expenses, including the
cost of loading, insuring, supervising,
unloading, storing and delivering the
goods, and bulk and certainty of traffic.
A variation in any of these items will
warrant a corresponding variation in
rates. Nor is it impossible to determine
with accuracy and precision the allowance to be made on account of any of
these items. It is certainly difficult, but

railway experts can and do determine it.
Carriers' discriminations in charges
arising from the causes above noted,
may, therefore, be expected, and, when
reasonable, may be accepted with confidence in their justice.
It is to be remembered that discrimination is the rule, not the exception,
and that when reasonable, it is right,
not wrong. It is only when the discrimination is unreasonable that it is
objectionable and illegal.
Railways always will charge more
for carrying small parcels to numerous
consignees than for carrying full train
loads to one person; and for going up
and down hills than for going across
level prairies. These, and many other
considerations affecting the expense of
transportation, readily warrant reasonable discriminations in the cost of it.
But discriminations in transportation
prices must correspond with differences
in transportation expenses. There is a
relation just, recognised, established by
law, and to be observed by all, between
the expense of carrying traffic on the one
hand, and the price chargeable for it on
the other. This u-uth is negatively expressed in many decisions and by many
judges. A carrier cannot" exact excessive prices." Arguendo: Churcliman v.
Tunstal, Hardress 163. He cannot
"extort what he will :" per LAwnENen, J., Harris v.
aclwood, 3
Taunt. 272 ; and see, Piclfordv. Grand
June. Railroad Co., 8 Mfees.& W. 377 ;
Hawk. P. C., Book I, ch. 32, sect. 2 .
.Tackson v.Rogers, 2 Show. 327 ; Esee
v. Gatward,5 Term Rep. 149 ; Chicago,
c., Railroad Co. v. Parks, 18 Ill. 491
Boson v. Sandford, I Show. 104; foIlisterv. .Nowlen, 19 Wend. 2.9 ; Colo v,
Gqodwin, Id. 261 ; Smith v. Chicago,
6-c., Railroad Co., 5 N. W. Rep. 242,
Brown v. Adams Express Co., 15 W.
Va. 821 ; Southern Express Co. v. M1emphis, 6-c., Railroad Co., 13 Cent. L. J.
68; Chicago, 6-c., Railroad Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11; Camblos v. P. 6- R.
Railroad Co., 4 Brews. 563.
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A positive recognition of the relation
between transportation-price ann transportation-expense, is found in OxIade
v. N.

E.

Railroad Co.,

(No.

1),

1

C. B. (N. S.) 454; 26 ,. J. (C.
P.) 129; 1 Xev. & Mac. 72, wherein
the rule was clearly affirmed, that a
railroad company is justified in carrying goods for one person at a less
rate than that at which they carry the
same discription of goods for another, if
there be circumstances which render the
cost to the company of carrying for the
former less than the cost of carrying for
the latter-a rule which pervades and is

recognised in all the cases upon the subject.
IV. DISCRIINATIONS IN TRAFrIo
RATES B3ASED UPON DiTyEnENcES IN
TRAFFIC QUANTITIE.-In Ransoyne v.

Eastern Co. Railroad Co., 1 C. B.
(N. S.) 437; 26 L. J. (0. P.) 91;
1 Nev. & 'Mac. 63, CnrSSWELL, J.,
speaking of the meaning of the expressions "undue or unreasonable preference or advantage," and "undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage,"
said : "Are these words to be construed
with reference to the interests of the
parties using the railway oply ? or may
the interests of, the railway owners be
taken in any manner into consideration ?
Bx. gr., if 1000 tons can be carried for
a lower sum per ton per mile than 100
tons, yielding an equal profit per ton to
the railway company, may they so regulate the charge as to derive such equal
profit? Would the lower rate charged
for the larger quantity give an undue
preference ?" and concluded, that " after
a good deal of consideration we think
the fair interests of the railway ought to
be taken into the account." The court
expressly refrained from deciding that a
railway company may not charge different rates where coal is carried in large
and small quantities.
In Oxiade v. N. R. Railway CJo. (No.
1), 1 C. B. (N. S.) 454; 26 L. J. (C.
P) 129 ; 1 Ncv. & Mlac. 72, counsel

for the company asked: "Are the company bound to afford the same facilities
to one who sends but a single wagon
load at a time that they do to one who
sends the larger quantities ?" CErssWELL, J., replied: " That is a question
not free from difficulty ; for if a large
dealer is to have his coals carried at a
lower rate than a small one, he will be
enabled to monopolize all the trade. It
may be, however, that the company are
enabled to carry at a lower rate in the
one case than in the other, by reason of
the difference in cost."
One branch of OxIade's complaint was
of a discrimination by the Northeastern
company in refusing to carry coal for him
at rates as low as 2d. per ton-thaft
being the rate at which it carried coal
for the Great Northern Railway Company. As to this discrimination the
evidence was that the Id. rate was a
through rate to London; that the Great
Northern found wagons (cars) for the
entire distance; that the coal was taken
in full train loads and very large quantities, and must be taken at a low rate or
not at alE; that the coal train engines
were fully and uniformly loaded, and
could be run without stopping or shunting (switching) with almost as much
regularity as passenger trains ; and it
was shown that if the trains were less
than fully loaded, and required stopping,
svitching and marshalling, the expense
was greater. The court concluded, that
"such circumstances enable the company
to carry such coals (for the Great Northern) at a cost to them less than the cost
of carrying coals for Mr. Oxlade. and it
is not shown that by carrying them at a
lower rate any undue or unreasonable
preference is given, or any undue or
unreasonable disadvantage imposed."
Cocicaun, C. J., in Harrisv. Corkermouth "W. Railway Co., 3 C. B. (N.
S.) 693; 27 L. J. (N. S.C.P.) 162 ; 4
Jur. (N. S.) 239 ; 1 Nev. & Mlac. 97:
says : "I quite agree that this court has
intimated, if not absolutely decided, that

HAYS v. THE PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY.
a company is entitled to take into consideration any circumstances, either of a
general or of a local and peculiar character, in considering the rate of charge
which they will interpose upon any particular traffic. As, for instance, if a
company were to lay down a rule that
if a certain large quantity of goods were
brought to be conveyed, they would
charge less for the conveyance of that
large quantity than they would for the
conveyance of a less quantity, regard
being had to the cost of working the
particular line ; that would be a very
fair ground to justify them in making a
distinction between the case of a person
who sent a ton of goods at a time and
the case of a person who sent only a
hundred weight."
But while it may be admitted that a
change in quantity may warrant a
change in rates, it does not necessarily
have this effect. A. may ship a much
larger aggregate quantity than B., but
at such inconvenient times, in such
small quantities or parcels, and to such
numerous consignees residing in so many
different places that the expense of carrying it will greatly exceed the expense
of B.'s traffic which, perhaps, comes
conveniently, in one quantity, and is
carried all at once a long distance to
one place of consignment. There does
not appear to be even a presumption
indulged that A.'s large quantity entitles him to rates as cheap as B.'s rates.
It must be shown, affirmatively and positively, not only that the quantity carried
for A. is larger than that taken for B.,
but also that, by reason of A.'s quantity
being the larger, the expense to the carrier is as small or smaller than the expense incurred in carrying B.'s quantity.
This fact being clearly developed by
testimony, the law will reduce A.'s rate
to or below B.'s. Mr. Justice WAILa s
VoL. XXXI.-7

clearly recognised the necessity of affirmatively showing how the change in
quantity affected the expense of carrying
when, in Garton v. Bristol 6- Exeter
ailway Co., 6 C. B. (N. S.) 639 ; 28
L. J. (C. P.) 306 ; 1 Nev. & Alac. 218,
with reference to Nicholson v. Great
Western Railway Co. (No. 1), 5 C. B.
(N. S.) 366 ; 28 L. J. (C. P.) 89 ; 4
Jur. (N. S.) 1187 ; 1 Nev. & Mac. 121,
wherein a difference in quantity was decided to warrant a difference in rate, he
said: "It is a mistake to suppose that
the court there intended to decide that a
prima fade case of preference is sufficiently answered by stating a difference
(for example, in quantity,) which may
or may not be material, in the circumstances between the carriage for the
person complaining and that for the
person alleged to have been preferred,
without showing that such difference
practically affects the fair charge for
carriage to an extent proportionate to
the difference of charge actually made
by the company to their several customers."
In brief, when it is undertaken to
justify discriminations in rates, by referring them to any of the things that
affect the expenses of carriage, the difference in quantity, in distance, or
whatever else is relied upon to justify
the discrimination must be shown,
clearly and beyond doubt, to be material-to affect such expenses really
and substantially. So far as the facts
relied upon are shown either to lessen
or to enlarge the expenses of transportation, to that extent, and no further,
will courts hold that such facts warrant
reduction or advancement of the prices
of transportation.
ADELBERT HAxdILTox.
Chicago.
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supreme Court of Indiana.
GEORGE BINFORD v. THOAIAS H. JOHNSON.
One who places in the hands of a child an article known to be dangerous is liable
for an injury resulting therefrom.
The fact of an intervening agency between the original wrong and the injury will
not prevent a recovery if the injury was the natural and probable result of the
wrong.
A dealer sold to two children, aged respectively 12 and 10 years, cartridges for a
pistol. One of the children left the pistol loaded with one of the cartridges on the
floor of his home, when a third child picked it up and it was discharged, killing one
of the children by whom the cartridges had heenpurchased. Held, that the dealer
was liable in damages to the father of the child killed.
The complaint is not bad because it does not state the next of kin of the child,
if it appears that the plaintiff is the father, that he had lost the child's services and
that he had expended time and money in endeavoring to cure the child.
An act in direct violation of a criminal statute is negligence in itself and it is not
error for the court so to charge.

from Montgomery Circuit Court.
This was an action for damages for causing the death of plaintiffs child.
The facts were as follows: Two sons of plaintiff, Allen and
Todd, aged twelve and ten years respectively, bought of the
defendant, a dealer in such articles, pistol cartridges loaded with
powder and ball. The boys purchased the cartridges for use in a
toy pistol, and were instructed by defendant how to make use of
them in this pistol; the defendant knew the dan'gerous character
of the cartridge, knew the hazard of using them as the boys proposed, and that the lads were unfit to be entrusted with articles
of such a character. Shortly after the sale the toy pistol, loaded
with one of the cartridges, was left by Allen and Todd lying on
the floor of their home; it was picked up by their brother Bertie,
who was six years of age, and discharged, the ball striking Todd
and inflicting a wound of which he died.
The verdict and judgment were for plaintiff. Defendant
appealed.
APPEAL

The opinion of the court was delivered by
ELLIOTT, J.-A man who places in the hands of a child an
article of a dangerous character and one likely to cause injury
to the child itself or others, is guilty of an actionable wrong.
If a dealer should seil io a child dynamite or other explosives of a similar character, nobody would doubt that he had
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committed a'wrong for which he should answer in case injury
resulted. So, if a, druggist should sell to a child a deadly
drug likely to cause harm to the child or injury to others, he
would certainly be liable*to an action.
The more difficult question is, whether the result is so remote
from the original wrong as to bring the case within the operation
of the maxim, causa proxima non remota spectatur. It is not
easy to assign limits to this rule, nor to lay down any general
test which will enable courts to determine when a case is within
or without the rule. It is true that general formulas have been
frequently stated, but these have carried us, but little, if any,
beyond the meaning conveyed by the words of the maxim itself.
The fact that some agency intervenes between the original
wrong and the injury, does not necessarily bring the case within
the rule ; on the contrary it is firmly settled that the intervention
of a third person, or of other and new direct causes, does not preclide a recovery if the injury was the natural or probable result
of the original wrong: Billman v. The Indianapolis, &c., 0o.,
76 Ind. 166. This doctrine is as old as the famous case of Scott
v. Shepherd, 2 W. Black. 892, commonly known as the " Squib
Case."
The rule goes so far as to hold that the original wrongdoer is
responsible even though the agency of a second wrongdoer intervened. This doctrine is enforced with great power by COCKBURN,
C. J., in Clark v. Chambers, L. R., 3 Q. B. Div. 327, and is
approved by the text writers: Cooley on Torts 70 ;'Addison on
Torts, sect. 12.
Although the act of the lad, Bertie, intervened between the original wrong and the injury, we cannot deny a recovery if we find
that the injury was the natural or probable result of appellant's
original wrong.
In Henry v. The Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 50 Cal. 176,
it was said: "A long series of judicial decisions have defined
proximate or immediate and direct damages to be the ordinary
and natural results of the negligence; such as are usual or probable
and might, therefore, have been expected." Lord ELLENBOROUGII
said, in Townsend v. Wathen, 9 East 280, that, "Every man
must be taken to contemplate the probable consequences of the act
he does."
In Billman v. Indianapolis,ft., Yo., supra, very many causes
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are cited declaring and enforcing this doctrine, and we deem it
unnecessary to here repeat the citations. Under the rule declared
in the cases referred to, it is clear that one who sells dangerous
explosives to a child, knowing that they are to be used in such a
manner as to put in jeopardy the lives of others, must be taken to
contemplate the probable consequences of his wrongful act. It is
a probable consequence of such a sale as that charged against the
appellant, that the explosives may, and will be so used by children
among whom it is natural to expect that they will be taken, as to
injure the buyers or their associates.
A strong illustration of the principle here affirmed is afforded
by the case of -Dixonv. Bell, 5 M. & Sel. 198. In that case the
defendant sent a child for a loaded gun, desiring that the person
who was to deliver it should take out the priming; this was done,
but the gun was discharged by the imprudent act of the child,
the plaintiff injured, and it was held that the defendant was
liable.
In Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29, the doctrine of the case cited
was approved, and the same judgment has been pronounced upon
it, by other courts, as well as by the text writers: Carter v.
Toune, 98 Mass. 567 ; Whart. Neg. 851 ; Shearman & Redf. Neg.,
3d ed., 596.
There is no such contributory negligence disclosed as will defeat
a recovery. The age of the lads who bought the cartridges, the
use the appellant knew they intended to make of them, and the
fact that they did use them as instructed by him, are all important
matters for consideration upon the question of contributory negligence.
There are very many cases holding that the age of the child is
always to be taken 'into account, and what would be negligence in
an adult will not be negligence in a young lad.
The Supreme Court of the United States thus states the rule:
"The care and caution required of a child is according to his
maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each
case by the circumstances of the case :" Railroad Oo. v. Stout, 17
Wall. 657. It must be the law, in cases of this nature, that the
age of the child shall be considered, or it must follow that a vendor
of the mostdangerous explosives may sell them as freely to young
children as to men of mature years, and this surely would be a
result which no reasonable man would undertake to support. In
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Potter v. Faulkner, 1 B. & S. 805, ERLE, 0. J., said: "The
law in England in its care for human life requires consummate
caution in the persons who deal with dangerous weapons," and we
think it may with equal truth be said that the common law, both
of England and America, requires of him who deals with dangerous explosives to refrain from placing them in the hands of
children of tender age. If the child is too young to know the
character of the thing sold him, it is the business of the dealer to
refuse to sell him articles likely to put in jeopardy his own or
some other person's life. Where one sells another a dangerous
instrument, and that other is ignorant, and this the seller knows,
of its true character, he is responsible for injuries resulting from
the negligent use of the instrument. There are many wellreasoned cases which, carrying the doctrine still further, hold
that one who places a dangerous thing in a position where ,it is
likely to cause injuries to others, is liable to a child who is injured
although he may be a trespasser: Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628;
State v. Mloore, 31 Conn. 47 9; Birge v. Gardiner,19 Id. 507;
Lyneh v. iRurdin, supra; Kerr v. O 'Connor, 63 Penn. St. 341;
.Keffe v. Milwaukee, &e., Co., 21 Minn. 207; Bailroad Co. v.
Stout, supra.
The case in judgment does not require us to carry the rule to
the extent which is done in the cases cited. Here the appellant,
with full knowledge of the character of the cartridges and fully
informed as to the use the lads intended to make of them, placed
these dangerous instruments in their hands, and he cannot now
escape liability upon the ground that the boys had no right to buy
or use such articles. Nor can he escape upon the ground that the
loaded pistol was left lying where the young child, Bertie, could
reach it. On'e who deals with children must anticipate the ordinary behavior of children. The appellant was bound to take
notice of the natural conduct of lads like those to whom he sold
the cartridges, -and it cannot be justly said that the act of the lads
in carrying the pistol with them to their home and leaving it upon
the floor, within reach of their brother and playmate, was an unnatural or improbable one.
It is contended that the complaint is bad because it does not
state who were the next of kin of the deceased, Todd Johnson,
and we are referred to The Cin., &'.,Co. v. Chester, 57 Ind.
297, 304; Pittsburgh, 'e., Co. v. Vining's Adm'r, 27 Id. 518;
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Indianapolis, c., Co. v. KYeeley, 23 Id. 136; Gann v. Worman,
69 Id. 458.
We do not think these cases support the attack upon the complaint. It is in two paragraphs, and the demurrer is to the entire
complaint, so that if one is good the demurrer is not well taken.
In the second paragraph it is explicitly set forth that the appellee
was the father of the deceased; that he expended money in and
rendered services in endeavoring to secure a cure of his son, that
he lost his services and society from the time he was wounded until
his death. These allegations bring the case within the rule that
money expended in the effort to cure a wound wrongfully caused
by the act of another may be recovered: The Cin., _ft., Co. v.
Chester, 57 Ind. 297; Cooley on Torts 262.
The right of action for the death is a statutory one, and is distinct and different from the personal right in the father recognised
by the common law. The complaint shows a right to some relief,
and this gives it sufficient strength to withstand a demurrer:
JBayless v. Glenn, 72 Ind. 5.
Additional strength is added to one at least of the paragraphs
of the complaint by the facts stated in it, showing that the cartridges were sold in violation of an express statute of the state.
By an act passed in 1875, and incorporated into the revision of
1881 as sect. 1986, it is made a misdemeanor to "sell, barter or
give to any person under the age of 21 years any cartridges manufactured and designed for use in a pistol."
In placing the cartridges in the hands of the lads, Allen and
Todd, the appellant did an unlawful act, and under settled principles is liable for the consequences naturally and proximately
resulting from his unlawful act.
In Weicek v. Lancer, 75 Ill. 93, it is held that "where an act
unlawful in itself is done from which an injury may naturally
and reasonably be expected to result, the injury, when it occurs,
may be traced back and visited upon the original wrongdoer."
In the course of the opinion, and as a commentary upon cases
reviewed, it is said:
"1The principle announced is that whoever does an unlawful act
is to be regarded as the doer of all that follows." The decision in
the case cited is well sustained. It finds support from the cases
heretofore cited, as well as from the following and many others :
Greenland v. 6hoslin, 5 Exch. 243; Powell v. Deveney, 3 Cush.

BINFORD v. JOHNSON.

300; Sheridan v. Brooklyn, &e., Co., 36 N. Y. 39; Griggs v.
.Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81; Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Co.,
104 Mass. 64; Tarrant v. Barnes, 11 0. B. (N. S.) 553.
Appellants attack one only of the instructions given by the
court. The instruction assailed reads thus : "I instruct you that
a sale of cartridges in violation of a criminal statute of the state,
would be, of itself, an act of negligence; and, if you find from the
evidence in this case that the defendant sold the cartridges as
alleged in the complaint such sale is an act of negligence on his
part, and you will have no further trouble on this point." The
sole objection stated is, that the court had no right to declare that
the sale of the cartridges in violation of law was an act of negligence.
The only case cited in support of appellant's position is the case
of Weiclk v. Lander, from which we have quoted, and it makes
against rather than for appellant.
Where a party does an act in direct violation of a positive
statute the court is justified in characterizing it as an act of negligence.
It is in general true that negligence is a question of fact, but
this is not universally true.
Judge COOLEY has examined this question, and with ability and
vigor discussed it. In the course of the discussion he says:
"Many cases clearly present mere questions of law," and that
"such are the cases of the disregard of a law expressly devised to
prevent the like injury."
An instance is that of the failure of a railway train to come to
a stop before crossing another road, as is required by the statute in
some states, whereby another train is run into. Here the negligence is plain, but it might happen that some parties injured by it
would by their own negligence be precluded from any redress.
The case would be equally clear if the railway company were to
send out a train without brakes, and thereby an injury should
result, through the impossibility of stopping a train when a danger
appeared, or if one were to set a bonfire in a town while a fierce
wind was raging; or if he were to send a package of dynamite by
express without disclosing its dangerous nature. Concerning such
cases no one should be in doubt: Cooley on Torts 670.
The principle that the court may, as matter of law, instruct the
jury that an act constitutes negligence, is illustrated by many
cases in our own reports. Thus, it has often been held that it is
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the duty of the court to instruct the jury that it is negligence for
a corporation to make a dangerous excavation in a public street,
and leave it unguarded. So, in relation to the duties of a railroad
corporation, the court often declares to the jury what act will constitute negligence, and this holds good of instructions upon the
subject of persons attempting to cross railroad tracks.
But without prolonging this opinion we refer, without comment,
to the cases of The Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657 ; Pittsburgh, ft., Co. v. Williams, 74 Ind. 462 ; L. & C. Co. v. Bichardson, 66 Id. 43; Ohio, &c., Co. v. Collarn, 73 Id. 261. It must
not be left out of mind that the instruction does not affirm that
there may be a recovery, but simply declares that it is negligence
for a person to voluntarily do an act in direct violation of a statute.
In a case where there is evidence tending to show some excuse
for doing an act prohibited by statute, it might, perhaps, be necessary to qualify the instruction, but there was here no such evidence, and it is to be remarked, the instruction refers, when taken
as it must be as an entirety, to such a sale as that charged in the
complaint, thus limiting the general proposition to the particular case..
The appellant asked the court to instruct the jury that if the
sale was to Todd Johnson and not to him and his brother jointly,
that there could be no recovery. We think this instruction was
properly refused.
It was sufficient for the appellee to sustain the substance of the
issue tendered by him. It was not material whether the boys
joined in buying the cartridges, if the sale was to one of them it
was an actionable wrong.
Judgment cannot be reversed for an immaterial variance, it is
only where the issue in its general scope is not sustained that a
reversal will be adjudged: R. S., sect. 393.
Instructions number two and fifteen, asked by the appellant, are
substantially the same, and as the former was given by the court,
it was proper to refuse the latter.
It is not error to refuse an instruction, when another, embodying the same matter, has been given.
The other questions presented upon the instructions are disposed
of in our discussion of the sufficiency of the complaint.
Judgment affirmed.
The controlling point in the principal
case and the theory followed is, that

the defendant, in making the sale to the
minor, violated an express statute; was
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guilty of a criminal offence and liable to
punishment by fine. Having sold the
pistol cartridges in direct violation of
the law, he was held liable for all the
results that may arise from such sale,
and of which it was the primary cause.
It is not uncommon to find cases decided
upon this theory. Thus, where a sign
over a street in a city, hung with due
care as to its fastenings but in violation of a city ordinance which subjected its owners to a penalty fdr
placing and keeping it there, was
blown down by the wind in an extraordinary gale, and in its fall a bolt
which was a part of its fastening
struck and broke a window glass in a
neighboring window-ir was held that
the owners of the sign were liable for
the injury to the window : Salisbury v.
iferdenroder, 106 Mass. 458.
The extraordinary gale was an intervening agency, and one against which
the defcndant would not usually have
been bound to provide; soin the principal case, the young child's discharging the
pistol was an intervening agency; but in
both cases the defendants had set in
motion something that brought eventually the result for which damages were
claimed and given. A long number of
cases support this doctrine. The famous
Squib Case proceeds upon this theory,
that the first act was unlawful, and
whatever mischief followed, the person
first starting the force was liable for all
the consequences: Scott r. S 7ephard, 2
Blackst. 892. So the Supreme Court
of Illinois held that where an act unlawful in itself is done, from which an
injury may reasonably and naturally be
expected to result, the injury, when it
occurs, may be traced back and visited
upon the original wrongdoer, and this
upon the principle that every person
shalt be held liable for all those consequences resulting from his act which
might have been foreseen and expected
as the result; Wilicc v. Lander, 75 Ill.
93. This was a case where the con-8
_.X
VOL.

tractor for the erection of a house in
Chicago placed a lot of brick in one of
the most public streets, in violation of an
ordinance, and owing to these and other
obstructions it was difficult for teams to
pass each other ; the plaintiff had two
teams hauling sand, one driven by his
son twelve years of age ; while the
teams were returning with their loads
the son got upon the back part of the
foremost wagon, and while occupying a
seat with his back to the tailboard, the
wagon was suddenly stopped by a collision with an express wagon at the place
of the obstruction, and the driver of the
rear wagon, watching to avoid a collision
on his part, did not observe the stoppage
of the front wagon uptil he was very
near it, and in attempting to stop ls
wagon the tongue was elevated and
struck the boy in the abdomen, inflicting
a wound causing his death. It was held
that the defendant was liable to the
plaintiff, the father, in damages for
causing the death of his son. This was
somewhat similar to Elidge v. Goodman,
5 Car. & P. 190, where the servant of
the defendant left a horse hitched to a
cart standing in the street ; a passer-by
struck the horse upon the head, and he
backed the cart in plaintiff's window and
damaged certain goods. The defendant
was held liable for the damage. But
the doing of an unlawful act is entirely
wanting in the case just cited. See
Powell v. Dilveny, 3 Cush. 300.
The principal case is not unlike Beg.
v. Bennett, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1088; s. c.,
28 L. J. (Mag. Cas.) 27 ; Bell's C. C.
1. There the defendant was a maker of
fireworks contrary to a statute, and
during his absence, through the negligence of his servant, a fire broke out
amongst some combustibles in his possession, which communicated with the
fireworks, and caused a rocket to shoot
.across the street and set fire to a house,
in wlich a person was burnt to death.
The court held that a conviction of manslaughter could not be sustained on
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these facts. If it had been a civil case
for damages, a different result would
probably have been reached.
Bearing in mind the facts of the principal case, the remarks of Lord DENMsAN,
C. J., in Lynch v. N¥urdin, 1 Q. B. 29,
are not inapplicable: "For if I am
guilty of negligence in leaving anything
dangerous in a place where I know it to
be extremely probable that some other
person will unjustifiably set it in motion,
to the injury of a third, and if that injury should be so brought about, I presume that the sufferer might have redress
by action against both or either of the
two, but unquestionably against the first.
If, for example, a gamekeeper returning from his daily excercige should rest
his loaded gun against a wall in the playground of schoolboys, whom lie knew to
be in the habit of pointing toys in the
shape of guns at one another, and one
of these should playfully fire it off at a
schoolfeilow, and maim him, I think it
will not be doubted that the gamekeeper
must answer in damages to the wounded
party." And the court cite in support
of the proposition the case where a man
left his horse, attached to a cart, unhitched in a crowded street, and a passer-by struck it, whereupon it ran away
and caused an injury to a third person.
It was held that the owner of the horse
was liable to the person injured : lllidge
See
v. Goodwin,, 5 Car. & P. 190.
McCahll v. Kipp, 2 E. D. Smith 413 ;
Sierners v. risen, 54 Cal. 418; Cox v.
Burbridge, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 430. So,
where the owner of a horse permitted it
to go at large in a populous street in a
city, and the horse kicked and injured a
child of ten years of age, the owner
was held liable for the injury: Dickson
v. M1cCoy, 39 N. Y. 400. Yet where
the fumes of crude petroleum, carried in
a tank on a lighter used in the oil trade,
escaped into a locker, which, on a night
when the vessel lay with others at a pier
in Jersey City, with no watchman on
board, was forced open by a thief, who,

exploring the locker with a lighted
match, set fire to the gas, causing an explosion and a fire, whereby the lighter,
and another that lay alongside, were destroyed, it was held that the owner of
the lighter was not liable: Scofield v.
Sonommers, 9 Ben. 526.
In an English case the circumstances
were these: the defendant sent a young
girl (thirteen years of age) to bring him
his loaded gun, directing her to request
the person who was to give it to her to
take out the priming. This was done,
and the gun handed to her. She in play
pointed it at the plaintiff's son, a child
of eight years of age, and drew the trigger; the gun went off and injured the
child. It was held that the defendant
was liable in damages to the plaintiff for
the value of the child's service: Dixon
v. Bell, 5 Maule & Sol. 198.
But where the defendant negligently
sold gunpowder to a child, and the child's
parents took charge of the powder, and
afterwards let the child take some of it,
by the explosion of which he was injured, it was held that the sale was only
a remote cause of the explosion, and the
child could not recover against the defendant: Carter v. Towne, 103 Mass.
507.
And where the defendant gave the
plaintiff a carboy, or large bottle, of
nitric acid, to carry, without informing
him of the dangerous nature of the acid,
and the carboy burst, and the acid inflicted dangerous wounds upon the plaintiff, and burnt and destroyed his clothes,
it was held that the defendant was responsible for damages for the injury:
Tarrant v. Barnes, 11 C. B. (N. S.)
553; s. c. 31 L. J. (C. P.) 137. See
Bross v. M1aitland, 6 El. & El. 470.
So where the defendant broke and entered the plaintiff's close lying adjacent
to a river, dug into a bank near a dam
across the river, and carried away some
gravel, in consequenceof which a flood
in the river, which took place three weeks
afterwards, carried away a portion of
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1d;

the close, and a cider-mill, &e., belong-- being led past the spot, slipped upon
the ice and broke its leg. It was held
ing to the plaintiff, it was held that th
plaintiff might recover damages for th that this was a consequence too remote
whole of such injury: Diclinson v. to be attributed to the unlawful act of
A.'s servant.
Boyle, 17 Pick. 78.
So where a party of slaves assembled
So where the defendant wrongfully *
placed a deleterious substance near the at the house of C., at night, to dance
plaintiff's well, and a freshet caused it and frolic, and it was a violation of a
to spoil the water, he was held liable in statute for C. to thus allow them to asdamages, although he had no intention semble; in the course of the night, a,
of causing an injury to the water: Wood- patrol went to arrest the slaves, and,
ward v. Aborn, 35 Me. 271. And where while they were attempting to escape,
the deceased was compelled by the con- fired a loaded pistol into a dark room
ductor to 9tand upon the platform of a and killed the slave of E. C. was held
crowded car, and, while there, was notliable to E. for the value of the slave,
thrown from the car by the hasty and the unlawful act of C. in permitting the
careless departure of another passenger, slaves to assemble being but a remote
it was held that the car company was cause of the damages: Bosworth v.
liable in damages, and that the wrongful Brand, 1 Dana 377.
act of the passenger did not relieve the
defendant company from the conseINJURIES RECEIVED BY A. CHILD
quences of their wrongful act in placing WHILE TRESPASSING.-The case of
the deceased upon the platform : Siterl- Lynch v. Nindin, 1 Q. B. 29, cited by the
dan v. Brooldyn, 6-c., Railroad Co., 36 court, was a case where the defendant's
N. Y. 39.
servant left his horse and cart unattended
The doctrine of the principal ease is in a populous street. The plaintiff, a
limited b the fact that the intervening child seven years old, got upon the cart,
agency is one which the first actor was in play ; another child made the horse
bound to anticipate. And so the court move on while the plaintiff was in the
says the defendant was bound to know act of getting down from it, in consethat a possible result, or even a proba- quence of which the plaintiff was thrown
ble result, was the act of the child who down and had his leg broken. The
deheld the pistql when it was fired and fendant was held liable in an action
on
killed his brother. This finds a fair the case, although the plaintiff was
a
illustration in Sharp v. Powell, L. R., 7 trespasser, and contributed
to the mis0. P. 253; s. a., 20 Week. Rep. 585, chief by his own act.
It was held that
41 L. J. (C. P.) 95 ; 26 L. T. (N S.)
it was properly left to the jury to find
436. There a servant of A., in viola- whether
the defendant's servant was
tion of a statute, washed a van in a
guilty of negligence, and if so, whether
public street, and allowed the waste
that negligence caused the injury in queswater to run down the gutter toward a
tion. Upon the question of contributory
grating leading to a sewer about twentynegligence this case is not the law now
five yards off. In consequence of the
in England : Mock's Underhill on Torts
extreme severity of the weather, the
288. This is the leading English case
grating was obstructed with ice, and the
upon the question of the right of a child
water flowed over a portion of the causeto recover for damages sustained while
way, which was ill-paved and uneven,
he is in the commission of a trespass.
and there froze. There was no evidence
In another case the facts were as folthat A. knew that the grating was oblows : The defendant exposed in a pubstructed. The plaintiff's horse, while
lic place, for sale, unfenced
and without
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superintendence, a machine which could
be set in motion by any passer-by, and
which was dangerous when in motion.
The plaintiff, a boy four years old, by
the direction of his brother of seven,
placed his finger within the machine
while another boy was turning the handle which moved it, whereby his finger
was crushed. The defendant was held
not liable, because the wrongful act of
the plaintiff had brought the act upon
him, and besides the defendant was
guilty of no negligence: Mangan v.
Atterton, L. R., i Exch. 239 ; s. c., 4
Hurl. & Colt. 388. But it may be well
doubted if the case is an authority so far
as the question of the negligence of the
defendant is concerned, since the remarks
of Chief Justice CooKnun in Clark v.
Chambers, 3 Q. B. Div. 327, 339. The
case of Lane v. Atlantic Works, 107
Mass. 104, is an instructive one upon
this subject. An ordinance prohibited
trucks standing in the street longer than
five minutes at a time. The defendant
left his truck, loaded with a heavy iron,
for the night in the street. Two children, seven and eight years old, crossed
the street at the solicitation of a boy,
twelve years of age, and mounted the

truck, three hours after it was left there.
The casting had been placed upon the
truck in a careless manner. Within one
minute after the two boys reached the
truck, the elder boy moved the tongue
of the truck and threw the casting down
upon tbe younger boy, to his injury. It
was held that if the truck was left negligently in the street or left insecure, and
the occurrence by which the injury was
received was one which might have reasonably been apprehended as the result
of such negligence, and was in fact the
result thereof, and the plaintil used due
care, the wrongful conduct of the boy who
moved the truck would not relieve the
defendant from liability, although it contributed to the result. The case of Railroad v. Stout, 17 Vall. 657, was where
a child, six years of age, sued a railroad company for an injury received
while riding upon a turn-table turned by
some boys. The plaintiff was clearly a
trespasser ; yet the company was held
liable because the company had failed to
fasten the turn-table so it could not be
moved. See Birge v. Gardner,19 Conn.
507.
W. W. THoNToN.
Indianapolis.
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ET AL.

If the conduct of an insurance company, in its dealings with the insured and other
policy holders, is such as to induce a belief that so much of the contract as provides
for forfeiture for non-payment of premium on the days fixed would not be enforced
if payment were made within a reasonable period thereafter, the company will not
be permitted to allege such forfeiture against one who acted upon that belief and
subsequently made or tendered the payment.
If the conpany are in the habit of sending renewal receipts to its agent, leaving
their use subject entirely to his judgment, and he is accustomed to receive premiums
from the insured several days after they become due, and the company or its managing agents or officers have full knowledge of such practice and receive and retain
the premiums so paid, and the insured relying on such practice tenders the premium
within a reasonable time after it is due, the company cannot forfeit the policy not-
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withstanding a clause declaring that agents have no authority to receive overdue
premiums or to waive forfeitures.
Where by the terms of the policy the premiums could be paid to an agent producing the proper receipt and the annual dividends could he applied in discharge of
premiums, and it had been the invariable custom of the company to send the insured
a statement of the premium due after deducting the dividend, with notice of the tino
when, the place where, and the person to whom the premium could be paid, and by
reason solely of a failure to send such notice a premium was not paid when due but
was tendered within a reasonable time afterward, the policy does not lapse.
Ttompson v. Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 258, distinguished.
Semble, Where the amount of the premium is liable to be reduced by dividends it
is the duty of the company to give the insured reasonable notice of the amount of
dividends and thereby inform him as to the cash to be paid in order to keep alive the
policy.
A case which fairly depends upon the effect or weight of testimony should not he
withdrawn from the jury unless the testimony be of such a conclusive character as
to compel the court in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to set aside averdiet returned in opposition to it.

WRIeT of error from a judgment for the amount of a policy of
insurance upon the life of Jackson Riddle, issued on the 20th day
of September 1871, by the Phoenix 'Mutual Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut.
The policy purported to have been issued in consideration as well
of the representations made in the application for insurance, as of
the payment by the wife and children of the insured (the payees
named in the policy) of the sum of $215, and the annual payment
of a like amount on or before the 20th day of September in every
year during its continuance. It contained a stipulation that if the
premium should not be paid at the office of the company in Hartford,
to some agent of the company producing a receipt signed by the
president or secretary, on or before the day of its maturity, then,
in every such case, the company should not be liable for any part of
the sum insured, and the policy should cease and determine, all previous payments being forfeited to the company. The policy was upon
the half-note plan, and it was part of the contract that the dividends set apart to the insured should be applied in the discharge, pro
tanto, of annual premiums. The secretary of the company, in his
evidence, stated that under the half-note plan the insured is permitted to discharge one-half of the first four premiums by notes
(the interest thereon to be paid in advance), and upon the fifth and
subsequent payments, to have his dividends, if any, applied in reduction of the premium. It was in proof that prior to the maturity
of the respective premiums, payable on the 20th days of September
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1872, 1873 and 1874, the company's general 'agent sent to the
insured, at his residence in Monticello, Illinois, printed notices,
showing when the premium became due, the amount of cash to be
paid, the interest on the notes given under the half-note plan, and
the amount for which an additional note, under that plan, was
required. Prior to the 20th of September, 1875,-when the fifth
annual premium was due,-the notice to the insured stated the
amount of dividends to be applied in reduction of that premium,
the interest to be paid in advance upon the notes previously
executed, and the sum to be paid in cash.
The amounts due in the years 1872, 1873, 1874 and 1875 were
paid, but not until the expiration of several (in some instances ten
or more) days after the time fixed by the 'policy. They were
received, in each instance, so far as the record discloses, without
objection upon the part of the company or its agent.
On the 6th day of October 1876, the insured lost his life in a
railroad collision, leaving unpaid the premium due on the 20th day
of September of that year. His residence and post office, for more
than a year prior to his death, had been at Oxford, Indiana. Of
his removal to that place the general agent of the company at Chicago was distinctly informed, as the evidence tended to show, as
early as October 1875. The letter from that office acknowledging
the receipt of the premium due on 20th September 1875 (but not
paid until about October 9th, of that year), was addressed to the
insured, at his new residence in Oxford, Indiana. On the 4th day
of October 1876-fourteen days after the premium for that year
was due-there was sent from the office of the company's general
agent at Chicago, addressed, by mistake, to the insured at Fowler,
Indiana, a notice similar to that given in 1875. This notice, the
evidence tended to show, was received from the post office, at Fowler,
Indiana (where the father never, resided), by a son of the insured,
on the day the latter was killed, and a few hours only before his
death. There was also proof that the insured before leaving his
home, at Oxford, Indiana, made arrangements to pay the amount
required in that year as soon as the customary notice, showing the
sum to be paid, was received. On the 9th day of October 1876,
the amount due was, in behalf of the payees, tendered to the company's general agent at Chicago. He declined to receive it, upon
the ground, that the policy lapsed by reason of the non-payment
of the premium, at maturity, in the lifetime of the insured.
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Upon the part of the payees it was contended that the company
waived strict compliance with the provision making the continuance
of the policy dependent upon the payment of the annual premium
on the day named therein; and that, in view of the settled course
of business between the company and its agents on one side and
the insured on the other, it was estopped to rely upon the non-payment of the last premium, at the day, as working a forfeiture of
the policy.

I. K. Barnard, for plaintiff in error.
Frank Doster, WF. F. Scott and John TF. Lynn, for defendants
in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARLAN, J.-The facts and circumstances established by the
testimony are sufficiently indicated in the charge of the court, to
certain parts of which, to be presently examined, the company
objected. It is enough to say that the testimony was ample to
enable each party to go to the jury upon the substantial issues in
the case.' The motion, at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, for
a peremptory instruction for the company was properly denied. It
could not have been allowed, without usurpation, upon the part
of the court, of the functions of the jury. Where a cause fairly
depends upon the effect or weight of testimony, it is one for the
consideration and determination of the jury, under proper directions as to the principles of law involved. It should never be
withdrawn from them, unless the testimony be of such a conclusive
character as to compel the court, in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion, to set aside a verdict returned in opposition to it. 9
Pet. 299 ; 12 Id. 5; 1 B1. 49; 14 Pet. 31; 13 Wall. 62; 93 U.
S. 146.
We now proceed to an examination of those parts of the charge
which were made the subject of exceptions by the company.
After saying that the policy, with the application, contained the
agreement of the parties; that the clause providing for a forfeiture
for non-payment of the premium at maturity, and declaring the
want of authority in agdnts either to receive premiums after the
time fixed for their payment, or to waive forfeiture, constituted a
part of the contract, binding upon both parties unless waived or
modified by the company or by its agent thereunto authorized;
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also, that strict performance of the forfeiture provision could be
waived by the company, either expressly or by .implication, the
court proceeded to lay down the rules by which the jury should be
guided in determining whether there was such waiver. It said, in
substance, that if the conduct of the company in its dealings with
the insured and others similarly situated had been such as to induce
a belief on his part that so much of the contract as provides for a
forfeiture, if the premium be not paid at the day, would be enforced if payment were made within a reasonable period thereafter,
the company ought not, in common justice, to be permitted to
allege such forfeiture against one who acted upon that belief, and
subsequently made or tendered the payment; and that if the acts
creating such belief were done by the agent and were subsequently
approved by the company, either expressly, or by receiving and
retaining the premiums, with full knowledge of the circumstances,
the same consequences should follow.
The court further told the jury, in substance, that if they found
from the evidence that the company were in the habit of sending
renewal receipts for the premium on this policy to its local agent,
at the place of residence of the insured, duly signed by the president and secretary of the company, leaving their use subject entirely
to the judgment of that agent, and the latter was accustomed to
receive the premiums from the insured, without objection, several
days after the same became due and to issue the receipt therefor,
and the home c6mpany or the managing agents or officers had full
knowledge of such practice, and received from its agent, and retained, the premiums so paid, the insured had a right to believe that
the company waived a strict compliance, and they might find that
there was a waiver by the company of the forfeiting clause of the
policy ; and if the insured, relying on such practice, within a reasonable or the usual time, paid or offered to pay the premium after
the day the same was due, the policy remained in full force and
effect, and the company was liable thereon, notwithstanding the
insured had in the meantime died.
The objection of the company to these parts of the charge were
overruled, and an exception taken. The objection would have more
weight had the 'eharge ended with these remarks, because in such
a presentation of the case the court would have placed before the
jury only one side of the issues to which it directed attention. But
the charge is not liable to such criticism, since the court, in the
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same connection, instructed the jury that if the company had not
authorized its local agent, to whom the renewal receipts were sent,
to extend the time for payment of the premium beyond the day
named in the policy, nor had habitually accepted from the insured
through its agent the premiums on the policy after the same became
due, with fall knowledge that the same were so paid after due and
the receipt issued by its agent, then that they could not find that
the company had either, expressly or by implication, waived a strict
compliance with the terms of the policy in reference to payment of
the premiums, and the policy became forfeited according to its
terms.
It seems to the court that the charge was as favorable to the
company as it could have demanded. It was, as to its essential
parts, in substantial harmony with recent decisions of this court.
In Insurance Co. v. Norton, 96 U. S. 239, we said, in reference
to a policy, similar to the one here in suit, that the company was
not bound to act upon the declaration that its agents had no power
to make agreements or waive forfeitures, but might, at any time,
at its option, give them such power; that the declaration was tantamount to a notice to the insured, which the company could waive
and disregard at pleasure. "In either ease," said the court "both
with regard to the forfeiture and to, the powers of its agents, a
waiver of the stipulation or notice would not be repugnant to the
written agreement, because it would only be the exercise of an option
which the agreement left in it. And whether it did exercise such
option or not, was a fact provable by parol evidence, as well as by
writing, for the obvious reason that it could be done without writing." In the same case it was said that, although in life insurance
time of payment was material, and could not be extended against
the assent of the company, where such assent was given the court
should be liberal in construing the transaction in favor of avoiding a forfeiture. And in ins. Co. v. Eggleston, 96 U. S. 597, it
was said, that the courts are always prompt to seize hold of any
circumstances that indicate an election to waive a forfeiture, or an
agreement to do so on which the party has relied and acted. CQnsequently, said the court, speaking by Mr. Justice BRADLEY;
"Any agreement, declaration, or course of action, on the part of
an insurance company, which leads a party insured honestly to
believe that by conforming thereto a forfeiture of his policy will not
be incurred, followed by due conformity on his part, will and ought
VOL. XXXI.-9
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to estop the company from insisting upon the forfeiture though it
might be claimed under the express letter of the contract. The
company is thereby estopped from enforcing the forfeiture. The
representations, declarations, or acts of an agent, contrary to the
terms of the policy, of course, will not be sufficient, unless sanctioned
by the company itself. Ins. Co. v. I3lowry, 96 U. S. 544. But
when the latter has, by its course of action, ratified such declarations,
representations, or acts, the case is very different." These authorities abundantly sustain the rulings in this case to which reference
has been made.
The court below then passed to an examination of the remaining ground relied on as to excusing the non-payment of the last
.premium on the day it fell due, viz., the failure of the company to
give the insured seasonable notice of the amount of dividends to
be applied in reduction of the premium.
After stating that by the terms of the policy the premiums could
be paid either at the home office or to an agent of the company,
producing the proper receipt, and that by the terms of the application, which was the basis of the contract of insurance, the annual
dividends due the insured could be applied in discharge of premiums, the court instructed the jury that if they found from the
evidence that it had been the invariable custom of the company to
transmit to the insured, by mail or by its local agent, a statement
of the amount of the premium due, after deducting the dividend,
with a notice of the time when, the place where, and the person to
whom, the premium could be paid, then the insured had good
reason to expect and rely on such statement and notice being sent
to him; and that if the insurance company, by its managing agent,
bad notice of the post-office address of the insured before the usual
time of sending out notice, but failed and neglected to transmit
such statement and notice to the insured at his post-office address
until the 4th day of October and, the same did not reach him or
the payees in the policy until October the 6th, and that the
insured or payees were ready and waiting to pay said premium
when the notice and statement should be received, and by reason
of such failure of the company to send the notice and statement,
and by reason of that alone, the premium due in September 1876,
.was not promptly paid; and that in a reasonable time thereafter, to
iwit, on Monday, the 9th day of October 1876, the payees tendered
the company at Chicago the full amount of the premium due, then
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the policy did not lapse or become forfeited, notwithstanding the
premium was not paid on the day named in the policy, and in the
lifetime of the insured.
To that part of the charge the company excepted. In the same
immediate connection the court below, it may be observed, further
instructed the jury that if it had not been the uniform custom of
the company to send the insured such notice and statement at or
about the time the premium became due, or if the company or
managing agent had not been notified of the change of the postoffice address of the insured until about the 4th day of October,
or that the company had in reality sent the notice, by mail or otherwise, at a prior date, properly addressed to the insured, then it was
not the fault of the company that the insured was not notified, and
the want of such notice would not excuse him from making payment at the day, and the policy would, consequently, become forfeited.
We are of opinion that these propositions are substantially correct. Nor do we preceive that the rulings of the court below are
in conflict with our decision in Tompson v. Rniurance Company ,
104 U. S. 258. In that case it appeared that the insured, for
a part of an annual premium, had given a note containing the
special provision that in the event of the non-payment of the note
at maturity, the policy should be void. The note was not paid at
maturity, nor was payment ever tendered, while the insured was
alive nor at any time after his death, by or in behalf of the payees
in the policy. To pleas setting up these facts replications were
filed, in which it was attempted to excuse the failure to make due
tender of the amount of the note upon the ground that it was the
usage and custom of the company, practised with the insured and
others, as well before as after the making of the note, not to demand
punctual payment at the day, but to give thirty days of grace ;
further, that it had been its uniform custom and usage, in advance
of the maturity of notes, to give notice of the day of payment,
whereas no such notice was given to Thompson, and thereby, it was
alleged, he was put off his guard and misled as to the time of payment. It was held that the failure to tender the amount due,
within the period named in the replication, was, in every view,
fatal to the entire case set up by the payees in the policy. "A. valid
excuse for not paying promptly on the day is," said the court, "a
different thing from an excuse for not paying at all." Touching
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the alleged failure of tbd company, in conformity with its uniform
practice, to give notice of the day of payment, it was said that the
insured knew, or was bound to know, when his premiums became
due, and that the company was under no obligation to give him
notice, nor did it assume any responsibility by giving notice on
previous occasions.
The present case has features which plainly distinguish it from
the Thompson case. In the former, there was a tender of the premium within a few days after the death of the insured, and as soon
as the payees ascertained the sum required to be paid. In the
latter, the amount to be paid was fixed. It was not liable to be
reduced on account of dividends or for any other reason, and the
insured, therefore, knew the exact amount to be paid in order to
prevent a forfeiture of the policy. Now, although the policy issued
upon Riddle's life required payment annually of a specific sum as
a premium, that stipulation must be construed in connection with
the agreement set out in the application, that the premium might
be discharged pro tanto by such dividends as were allowed to the
insured from time to time. Whether the company, in any particular year, declared dividends, and what amount was available in
reduction of the premium, were facts known, in the first instance,
only to the company, which had full control of the matter of dividends. It certainly was not contemplated that the insured should
every year make application, either at the home office, or at the
office of its general agent in Chicago, in order to ascertain the
amount of dividends. The understanding between the parties upon
this subject is, in part, shown by the practice of the company.
Independently of that circumstance, and waiving any determination of the question whether the forfeiture was not absolutely waived
by the act of the general agent, in sending notice to the insured
after the day fixed for the payment of the premium due September
20th 1876, it was, we think, the company's duty, under any fair
interpretation of its contract, having received information as to the
post office of the insured, to give seasonable notice of the amount
of dividends, and thereby inform him as to the cash to be paid in
order to keep alive the policy. It did, as we have seen, give such
notice in 1875, and received payment of the amount due after the
date fixed in the policy. Within a reasonable time after the notice
for 1876 came, in due course of mail, to the hands of one of the
payees, a tender of the amount was made to the general agent at

